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(i) 
ABSTRACT 
Current debate concerning secondary education has given rise to 
questions relating to the relative emphasis which should be given to 
both the development of knowledge and understanding by the pupils, and 
socialization during secondary education. Focussing on the former 
would seem to correlate with the acceptance of a view that a universal 
structuring of all knowledge is possible and that the secondary curriculum 
should be primarily concerned with pupils acquiring knowledge within such 
a structure. Conversely, when the secondary school is considered to be 
primarily an agency of socialization, such a view of knowledge would not 
appear to be accepted. In this case, knowledge may be seen to be 
culturally bound and socially determined. 
In his article entitled "Liberal education and the nature of 
1 knowledge" Hirst analyses knowledge as being structured into logically 
distinct and mutually irreducible forms. Each such form has certain 
central concepts which are characteristic of that form. For a given form 
of knowledge these and other concepts denote particular aspects of 
experience. The networks of possible relationships between the concepts 
specific to a form of knowledge form a basis for understanding experience. 
These relationships may be understood within the distinctive logical 
structure of that form. By virtue of its particular terms and logic, each 
form has distinctive expressions and statements, which are testable against 
experience. The various forms of knowledge are also differentiated 
according to techniques and skills which have developed for exploring 
experience and testing their characteristic expressions and statements 
against experience. 
The acceptance of such an analysis has clear and necessary implications 
for both the planning and conduct of seconda'.!'.Y education. 
l ' t H Hirs , P. • , Knowledge and the curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, pp.30-53. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation relates to the paper entitled "Liberal education 
and the nature of knowledge" written by Professor Paul H. Hirst, which 
was published in Philosophical Analysis and Education (R.K.P., 1965). 
In it the author advances a thesis analysing the necessary differentiation 
of knowledge into logically distinct forms and considers the implications 
of this thesis for the content and conduct of a liberal education. 
Thus the central themes of this dissertation will be a consideration 
of Hirst's analysis relating to "forms of knowledge", an examination of 
their place in a liberal education, and the implications of both these 
aspects for current secondary education in Tasmania. 
Such considerations are of .particular relevance to the current 
discussions and public concern relating to Tasmanian secondary education. 
Since approximately 1950 public debate on secondary education appears to 
have moved through two clear stages and to be currently entering a third 
stage. In the first instance doubts were expressed as to whether or not 
the syste.m of high and modern schools, which operated in Tasmania before 
the 1960's, was catering for the abilities of all secondary pupils. Of 
particular concern was the possibility that a significant number of 
students, who had the ability to succeed within the more academically 
oriented curricula offered by the high schools were, through selection 
procedures based entirely on the measurement of intelligence quotients, 
being denied an opportunity to succeed academically at the high school 
level. As a consequence the abolition of selective high schools, which 
was completed in Tasmania by the early 1960s, became the means by which 
equality of educational opportunity was to be provided for all secondary 
students. In this context "equality of educational opportunity" referred 
to the unrestricted entry of all pupils, who had completed their primary 
education, into a high school, and to the possibility of all courses of 
study offered by the school being available to all pupils. 
The subsequent establishment of comprehensive high schools throughout 
the state appeared to engender a second phase of public debate, which 
had as its central issues the internal organisation of schools and the 
selection of pupils for the various curricula within schools. This move-
\ )-
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ment was accompanied by the development of different subject syllabi 
for pupils of various "levels of ability" in an attempt to solve the 
problem of underachievement by students undertaking traditional curricula. 
Criticisms of contemporary secondary curricula, which have undergone little 
change since then, range from allegations that these lead to the fragment-
ation of knowledge, and thus deny students the opportunity to come to an 
understanding of "society as a whole", to criticisms of "progressive" 
teaching methods, unstreaming and innovations such as expansion into the 
'soft' social sciences and "open" education. Moreover, the so-called 
"tyranny of subjects" as practised in high schools is now being vigorously 
opposed by suggesting "integrated" curricula based, for example, upon 
themes, topics or projects. 
It is my belief that the apparent failure of these measures, and the 
~rowing public and professional concern being expressed with regard to 
the inadequacy of secondary education in Tasmania, will give rise to 
extensive re-consideration of the secondary curriculum. It is my expecta-
tion that these considerations will focus upon the total curriculum of 
secondary schools, their planning and teaching. Such emphasis would generate 
discussions on the fundamental nature of knowledge itself and the implica-
tions for curricula and curricula planning. In this sense Hirst's analysis 
relating to the basic structuring of knowledge into autonomous forms, and 
of the possibility of a universally valid curriculum, may be seen as 
completely opposed to the views of some sociologists. For example, 
Michael F.D. Young1 postulates that knowledge is socially-derived and 
culturally dependent. In the extreme, such a view may deny the possibility 
of anything other than a totally individualised curriculum. Hirst's paper 
on a "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" may, therefore, 
provide a basis upon which current secondary education in Tasmania can be 
discussed. 
In order that such discussions may be based upon a detailed analysis 
of the above paper, the first section of this dissertation undertakes such 
an analysis. The three distinct aspects of this paper - namely, the concept 
of a "liberal" education, the nature of knowledge, and the planning and 
1 Young, Michael, F.D., as in 
Brown, R.D. (Ed.), Knowledge, Education and Cultural Chan~, Tavistock, 1973 
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conduct of a liberal education - are separately considered. 
The second section of this dissertation considers the implications 
of the foregoing analysis for secondary education, and, in particular, for 
secondary education in Tasmania. These considerations, for reasons 
previously outlined, strongly emphasise the centrality of Hirst's analysis 
to the secondary curriculum and to current professional debate on secondary 
education. To this end possible definitions of the curriculum and 
curriculum objectives, as well as curriculum integration and possible 
implications for the management of secondary education are discussed in 
detail. 
,_ 
SECTION A 
LIBERAL EDUCATION 
and the 
NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
1. 
The Concept of Liberal Education 
Throughout "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" Hirst 
is concerned with providing an adequate characterization and justification 
of a liberal education. The search for a definition of such an education 
is, according to Hirst, justified on the basis that to deny the value of 
such a search would be to bring into question the worthiness of the pursuit 
of rational knowledge and to "question the pursuit of any kind of rational 
knowledge is in the end self-defeating, for the questioning itself depends 
upon accepting the very principles whose use is finally being called into 
question111 • His requirement that any definition of education, and hence 
of a liberal education, must be accompanied by a justification may, it is 
contended, in itself be justified on the basis that the activities of 
education must always be intrinsically worthwhile, i.e. the activities 
e~gendered by such a definition must be capable of more than instrumental 
justification. And it is in this sense that Hirst appears to be in agree-
ment with Peters' notion of educational activities being such that they are 
not differentiated in terms of task and achievement, and are hence of 
intrinsic value to individuals. The completion of an activity by an 
individual may be worthwhile to that individual solely on the basis of it 
being found to be valuable in itself. That is, the valuing of the activity 
by the individual does not entail the differentiation of the task involved 
in the activity with the achievement of completing it. For example, a 
student may find solving a particular problem in mathematics worthwhile. 
In so valuing solving this problem the student may not separate the task of 
solving the problem from the achievement of having solved it. For this 
case the activity of solving the problem is intrinsically worthwhile to 
the student. By comparison, the student who finds the solution of the 
problem worthwhile only because its completion enables him to gain something 
he values which is extrinsic to solving the problem, has, in valuing this 
activity, separated task and achievement. Alternatively, it may be argued 
that the requirement that a definition of education be accompanied by a 
justification for that definition arises only through employing definitions 
which prescribe intrinsic value as an essential characteristic of educational 
-
1Hirst, P.H., "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge", 
Phil~sophical Analysis and Education, 
R.K.P., 1965, p. 113. 
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activities. 
However, Hirst's definition and justification of his view of a liberal 
education does not necessarily involve such an essential characteristic; 
rather he bases the notion of such an education on the "nature and 
significance of knowledge itself111 • Furthermore, it is indicated that 
the definition and justification of a liberal education has "ever since 
the Greeks been repeatedly located in man's conception of the diverse 
forms of knowledge he has achieved112 • It is on this basis that a consid-
eration of the Greek notion of a liberal education becomes important to 
any examination and comparison of Hirst's proposals. 
For the Greeks the development of the concept of a liberal education 
depended upon the significance of the acquisition of knowledge for the 
mind, and the relationship of this knowledge to reality. Knowledge was 
significant in that its pursuit was considered essential to the ultimate 
development of the mind, and the means by which the good life was to be 
obtained. Moreover, it was asserted that, through the "right" use of 
reason "the mind comes to know the essential nature of things, and can 
apprehend what is real and immutable113 • This view of the attainment of 
knowledge leads to the notion of different levels of knowledge, and hence 
implies the incorporation of all knowledge into a comprehensive hierarchical 
structure, the pattern of which is formed as knowledge of ultimate reality 
is developed. An education based upon such a metaphysical conception of 
knowledge is justified on the grounds that, not only is it based upon what 
is true and is such that it has value to the individual in development of 
the mind, but it is essential to man's understanding of how he should live. 
Thus the significance of this concept of a liberal education arises from 
the position which the basic metaphysical doctrines give to knowledge in 
their unifying concept of mind and reality. 
But Hirst's explicit stipulation that a liberal education must be 
1Hirst, P.H.,~"Liberal education and the nature of knowledge", 
Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 32 
2 
op• cit., p. 32 
3 
op. cit., p. 31 
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characterized by being based upon the nature of knowledge alone, is an 
attempt to define education in such a way as to reject the doctrines of 
metaphysical and epistemological realism, which are fundamental to the 
Greek notion of a liberal education. If, as Hirst argues, knowledge is 
not thought of as developing the mind and is no longer essential to 
man's conception of how he ought to live, then it may become necessary to 
specify those qualities of mind and moral virtues, which are fundamental 
to a liberal education. In addition to the difficulties inherent in the 
stipulation of such qualities and values, it may be argued that if the 
significance of the acquisition of knowledge to the development of the 
mind and to the good life is questioned, it becomes difficult to justify 
-
an education based upon knowledge alone. Thus attempts may be made to 
define a liberal education in terms of the development of mental abilities, 
which are agreed upon as being desirable and which are independent of 
knowledge. But, as Hirst contends, the exercise of such an ability only 
becomes apparent through associated and publicly describable and testable 
achievements. Hence such an ability must be specified in public terms 
and criteria. But such a specification is dependent upon the public 
features of the knowledge concerned. Thus if mathematical knowledge is 
describable in public terms,, then those activities as~umed to indicate 
the exercise of a mathematical ability may be described and assessed 
publicly. For example, to speak, in this context, of "the ability to 
solve quadratic equations" becomes meaningful, if and only if, {a) the 
complete field of knowledge relating to the solution of quadratic equations 
'is describable in terms which are publicly understood, and (b) there are 
publicly accepted terms and criteria through which the exercise of such 
an ability can be described and assessedo 
It follows then that such public specification is logically necessary 
to the indication of mental abilities, and that no such specification can 
occur without a full account of the public features of the related areas 
of knowledge. It is on these grounds that Hirst concludes that not only 
v 
can a liberal education not be adequately defined in terms of mental 
abilities, but that public description of the fields of knowledge involved 
is a prior and logically necessary condition for its specification. In 
addition, given that such criteria are specific to the particular area 
of knowledge in terms of which an ability is to be specified, and that 
. )• 
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these criteria, and therefore abilities, are not generalizable to other 
areas of knowledge, then the definition of a liberal (general) education 
in terms of a set of abilities would seem to be precluded. 
But 
and 
the use of broad, general terms for these abilities 
serves in fact to unify misleading quite disparate 
achievements 1, 
the impression is created by this terminology that 
it is possible to develop unitary abilities 2. 
The extent to which such abilities are possible is, according to Hirst, 
a matter for empirical investigation. If identified these abilities 
must be characterized in terms of the public features of knowledge. Transfer 
of training may then be considered in terms of the possible application of 
such abilities to diverse fields of knowledge. In this case the criteria 
which determine whether or not a particular ability may be applied to a 
given field of knowledge would be vital to the significance of this ability 
for a liberal education. On this basis if the criteria for a particular 
ability were drawn from the public features of several of the forms of 
knowledge, then this ability would be highly significant in defining a 
liberal education. 
.-
Hirst considers that discussing a liberal education in these terms 
leads to the danger of "looking for transfer of skills where none is 
discernible"3. That is, skills developed in relation to one form of-
knowledge are unlikely to be transferred through their application in 
another form of knowledge. This is not to deny, however, that knowledge 
acquired in one area can be used in the study of other areas of knowledge. 
For example, knowledge acquired through a s~udy of mathematics may assist 
in the understanding of the physical sciences. 
In additton, Hirst rejects the claim that, for _example, the study of 
one major science can lead to a liberal education through the development 
1Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 36 
2 
op. cit., p. 36 
3 
op. cit., p. 36 
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of 'abilities such as "effective thinking" and "effective communication". 
His basis for this rejection is that, even if these abilities could be 
satisfactorily defined it remains to be empirically demonstrated that 
these abilities are general, but distinct, and that they can be developed 
by the study of one particular area of knowledge. 
By its exclusion of all aspects of study other than those which 
could be classified as intellectual studies, a liberal education based 
entirely on knowledge may not be considered to provide for the total 
education of a child in that it ignores, for example, character education. 
Furthermore, it may be claimed that the range and depth of development 
of intellectual skills encompassed by such an education is necessarily 
limited - linguistic skills, for example, may only be developed to the 
level required for the use as "tools" in the acquisition of knowledge. 
In addition to these limitation~, it may be proposed that a liberal 
education so defined, and in contrast with that of Greek origin, evidences 
a lack of concern for moral commitment. For whereas the Greek notion of 
a liberal education was, in general terms, justified on the basis that 
(a) it is based upon what is true, 
(b) knowledge is a distinctive human virtue, and 
hence of value to the mind, and 
(c) knowledge is essential to man's understanding of how he 
ought to live, Hirst's proposals tend to emphasise the understanding of 
moral matters rather than a commitment to moral principles. But any 
such understanding in this sense would appear to be related to whether 
or not man's moral understanding is necessarily dependent upon religious 
knowledge or beliefs, and hence, for Hirst, whether religious knowledge 
can be categorized as a "form of knowledge". The assumption of both of 
the above proposals woul? enable moral education to be given a religious 
basis and to be a part of a liberal education. Alternatively, if moral 
education is independent of religion, then, depending upon whether or not 
there is a Hirstian form of moral knowledge, moral education may again 
be an autonomous component of a liberal education. In such terms, such 
an education cannot be considered to be a total education where a total 
education not only involves a liberal education but may also include, 
for instance, physical education and character training. Clearly the 
6 • 
validity of this argument is dependent upon the characterization of a 
total education which in turn raises the dual and ultimately ethical 
questions of what part of a total education should be included, in 
particular, in secondary education and also, who should be responsible 
for the constituent parts of such a total education. A more detailed 
consideration of these questions is undertaken in the second section 
of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, it may be alleged that as the proposed liberal education 
does not include everything other than specialist education and, other 
than the development of the mind, is not concerned with aspects of personal 
development such as emotional andmoral development it cannot be considered 
to be a general education. In addition, and on the assumption that the 
concepts and logical structure of one form of knowledge are necessarily 
valueless as vehicles for knowledge and understanding in another domain, 
specialisation through the exclusion of certain forms of knowledge cannot 
form the basis of such a general education. 
Now it may be contended that Hirst's characterization of a liberal 
education indicates a concern for only the academically able pupils and 
for the retention of the traditional curricula as typified by those of the 
Granunar schools of the United Kingdom. These allegations would appear to 
rest upon, at least, the following assumptions:-
(i) that success in the acquisition of knowledge and 
understanding of the various forms of knowledge is 
necessarily dependent upon certain "abilities" of 
the students; 
(ii) that advocating traditional curricula is inappropriate 
because 
(a) these have existed for a long period and hence need to be 
changed; 
(b) their retention precludes the use of 'modern' teaching 
approaches, and 
(c) there are matters of greater importance which should receive 
priority in curricula development. It is empirically evident that there 
7 • 
are different degrees of success in the acquisition of knowledge, and 
understanding by different students, but it does not necessarily follow 
that the content of a curriculum should be entirely determined according 
to this single criterion, if at all. Again, difficulties experienced by 
pupils in studying a particular curriculum may arise from factors other 
than the content of that curriculum, teaching approaches constituting 
one such vital factor. Furthermore, it is neither logically nor 
empirically necessary that the length of the period for which a particular 
curriculum has been in use iri any way determines the value of such a 
curriculum or the teaching methods which may be employed in relation to 
it. There is, however, a need to examine in detail the final claim 
relating to the curriculum proposed by Hirst, viz. that there are matters 
of greater importance (than the forms of knowledge) which should receive 
priority in curriculum developm~nt. That is, the justification, and the 
values upon which this justification for Hirst's curriculum proposals 
rest, must be carefully considered. 
The basis for Hirst's justification of a liberal education which 
rests solely upon his analysis relating to the structuring of knowledge 
into 'forms of knowledge', is that there is a "logical relationship between 
the concept of 'mind' and the concept of 'knowledge', from which it follows 
that the achievement of knowledge is necessari~y the development of the 
mind - that is, the self-conscious rational mind of man - in its most 
fundamental aspect11 l. Thus the connection between knowledge and the 
development of the mind is not, as was the case for the Greek notion of a 
liberal education, being maintained on metaphysical, but rather on logical 
grounds. 
To ask for justification at all of any activity is significant only 
if there is some form of commitment to what we are seeking to justify. 
Thus to ask for a justification for the pursuit of rational knowledge 
presupposes some commitment to this pursuit, and, at least, to a rational 
knowledge of any such justification. Furthermore, such a justifi,eation 
is only possible if what is being justified is intelligible in the sense 
that it may be understood in terms of concepts and judgments, which may 
1 . t p Hirs , .H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 39. 
I>• 
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be made in accordance with publicly accepted criteria. The essential 
pre-requisites for any such justification are the assumptions that the 
pursuit of rationa~ knowledge is worthwhile, and that the characteristic 
features of the structures through which knowledge acquires rationality, 
and hence the criteria against which judgements are to be assessed, may 
be publicly expressed·as a coherent symbol system. Under these assumpt-
ions, structures other than those advocated by Hirst could form the 
basis of a similarly reasoned justification. 
Again,if a commitment to an activity is necessary before we can 
consider attempts to justify that activity as significant, then on what 
basis is such a commitment justified? That is, we may ask for wh?.t rcason,or 
reascr.s, do we advocate the pursuit of this or that activity. This, in 
effect, is to suggest that we must consider, in the broad sense, importing 
a utilitarian principle. Thus 
•••• we cannot rest content with justifactory arguments 
which, in the final analysis, rest upon an appeal to 
notions like pursuing activities just for the sake of 
pursuing them or pursuing them because they are valuable 
in themselves 1. 
To ask why we should pursue rational knowledge indicates a prior 
commitment to that pursuit, but to ask why we should study physics does 
not logically entail a commitment to the study of this subject. Thus the 
transcendental argument used by Hirst to support his prescription for a 
liberal education "fails to show that there, is something logically odd 
about asking whether or not one should pursue rational knowledge in a 
2 
rather stronger sense ••• " 
Alternatively Dearden3 offers an instrumental justification by 
maintaining that different forms of understanding - mathematical, scientific, 
aesthetic - are basic constitutive elements of rational choice. On this 
1woods, R.G. and Barrow, R.St.C., An Introduction to Philosophy in Education, 
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1975, p. 35. 
2 Lawton, D., Class, Culture and Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975, p. 79. 
3 Dearden, R.F. as in Lawton, D., Class, Culture and Curriculum, 
R.K.P., 1975, p. 79. 
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basis it may be claimed that the initiation of children into these forms 
"helps them to make rational choices, to choose their own paths through 
life and not simply do or believe what others tell them, in short, to 
become autonomous pe~sons 111 • But if it is admitted that initiation into 
the various forms of knowledge is a pre-requisite to becoming an autonomous 
person, then a complete justification of a curriculum based on these forms 
requires a prior justification of the ideal of personal autonomy. Dearden 
attempts this justification as follows: 
Even for me to question whether I ought to test my 
beliefs and make my choices according to my own 
reasoned judgement, rather than in obedience to 
authorities, is already to have decided in favour 
of autonomy; for I am asking for reasons as to what 
I ought to do, and taking it for granted that it is 
I who will decide the merits of the answers .2 
But this is again a transcendental argument. For to ask whether or 
not I should be an autonomous person may only be asked if there is at 
least some commitment to personal autonomy. Alternatively, the questioner 
may not attribute intrinsic value to such autonomy and may, in fact, answer 
"No" to the question. 
In justifying his concept of a liberal education Hirst contends that 
the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of the mind. 
In terms of the forms of knowledge and their public symbolic expression 
evidence for the achievement of knowledge and for the development of the 
mind would both be sets of statements made in terms of this public symbolism. 
Given any set of such public statements it would, therefore, not seem 
possible to determine whether or not the set was evidence for either the 
"acquisition of knowledge" or "the development of the mind", or both. In 
this case, two possibilities may arise. Fir.stly, it may be proposed that 
acquiring knowledge and-developing the mind are synon~·mous in meaning, and 
that this meaning is that conveyed by the set of public statements. Thus 
the difficulty of relating mind and knowledge is apparently removed by 
1 Dearden, R.F. The Philosophy of Primary Education, 
R.K.P., 1968, p.46. 
2 
op. cit., p. 46. 
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stipulation. But given that there can be no evidence to support such a 
stipulation it is apparent that it must be based upon the belief that 
this stipulation is aimed at the truth. In this instance the word 
"truth" is being used in an evaluative, rather than objective, sense. 
If knowledge is considered to be socially determined then it may 
be suggested that 
we can point to relatiqns between the patterns of 
dominant values and the distribution of rewards 
and power, and the organisation of knowledgel 
for a particular society. Thus, for example, a society which gives high 
priority to technological achievement would highly value knowledge of 
the physical sciences which is basic to technology. In this case know-
ledge of the human sciences, such as psychology and sociology, would assume 
lesser importance and may be considered to be subordinate to the physical 
sciences. That is the patterns of dominant values within a society may 
be correlated to the various categories of knowledge which together con-
stitute the total knowledge of the society. A proposition concerning 
knowledge from any such category will have associated with it the partic-
ular set(s) of correlating values. The assessment of the truth or falsity 
of the proposition will involve testing against the truth criteria for 
this category, and these will be value-oriented~hus a proposition will be 
assessed as true only if the values it connotes are in accordance with 
those associated with the knowledge category. The proposition would be 
true in the evaluative and not in the objective sense. Secondly, it may 
be suggested that there is a logical relation between 'mind' and 'knowledge'. 
But a logical relation would appear to be an expression of a belief which 
is held for a reason, this reason being that what is proposed is the 
truth. But if so, what are the criteria for truth, and if these are not 
available in an objective form, then, as before, 'truth' is being used in 
an evaluative sense. Prohlef!'!s arising in this connection, such as those 
pertnining to 11 truth theory", do n~t- appear to be central to this dissertation. 
For the Greeks these-evaluations were encompassed within the doctrines 
of metaphysical and epastemological realism. For Hirst these doctrines 
are replaced by beliefs purporting to be aimed at the truth, and expressed 
through stipulation. 
1Young, M.F.D._, 
Brown, R. (Ed.), 
curricula and the Social Organisation of Knowledge, 
Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, Tavistock, 
1973, p. 352. 
, .. 
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Forms of Knowledge 
Both the definition and the justification of Hirst's concept of a 
liberal education are dependent upon his thesis that knowledge is 
structured into forms. "By these is meant, of course, not collections 
of information, but the complex ways of understanding experience, which 
man has achieved, which are publicly specifiable, and which are gained 
through learning111 • It is maintained that by the sharing of conceptual 
schema, and its associated public symbols that such an understanding 
becomes possible and acquires objectivity in the sense that there is 
public concensus as to the meaning of symbols. That is, the objective 
expression of assertions relating to experience in terms of these symbols 
permits the development of public criteria against which the truth or 
validity of such assertions may be assessed. Continued and progressive 
assessments enable the probing and (public) description of more complex 
experiences, and thus the further development of knowledge. Hirst 
contends that it is only in terms of the symbols detailing the structure 
of such knowledge that emotional experiences or mental attitudes and 
beliefs become intelligible. Thus to acquire knowledge is to become aware 
of experience as being structured and organised, and made meaningful in 
a specific way. This structure does,not, Hirst considers, arise because 
the mind has pre-determined patterns of functioning - to have a mind is 
to have experience organised according to conceptual frameworks. 
Each developed form of knowledge is characterized by the following 
related distinguishing features: 
(1) They each involve certain central concepts that 
are peculiar in character to the form. For 
example, those of gravity, acceleration, hydrogen, 
and photosynthesis characteristic of the sciences; 
number, integral and matrix in mathematics; God, 
sin and predestination in religion; ought, good 
and wrong in moral knowledge. 
(2)·- In a given form of knowledge these and other 
concepts that denote, if perhaps in a very complex 
way, certain aspects of experience, form a network 
of possible relationships in which experience can 
lH. irs t, P • H. , Y..nowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 44. 
' ,_ 
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be understood. As a result the form has a 
distinctive logical structure. For example, the 
terms and statements of mechanics can be meaning-
fully related in certain strictly limited ways 
only, and the same is true of historical explana-
tion. 
(3) The form, by virtue of its particular terms and 
logic, has expressions or statements (possibly 
answering a distinctive type of question) that in 
some way or other, however indirect it may be, are 
testable against experience. This is the case in 
scientific knowledge, moral knowledge, and in the 
arts, though in the arts no questions are explicit 
and the criteria for the tests are only partially 
expressible in words. Each form, then, has 
distinctive expressions that are testable against 
experience in accordance with particular criteria 
that are peculiar to the form. 
(4) The forms have developed particular techniques and 
skills for exploring experience and testing their 
distinctive expressions, for instance the techniques 
of the sciences and those of the various literary 
arts. The result has been the amassing of all the 
symbolically expressed knowledge that we now have 
in the arts and the sciences.l 
Thus, it is proposed that the domain of human knowledge can be 
differentiated into a number of logically distinct "forms", none of 
which is ultimately reducible in character to the others. 
On the basis of these characteristics it is proposed that there 
are the following distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge: mathematics, 
physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the 
fine arts, and philosophy. 
Examining the first three characteristics, which provide the logical 
distinctions between the various forms, thus becomes a primary task. 
In making these proposals it is clear that Hirst considers the 
primary elements of knowledge to be true propositions. 
And it is for this reason that his third criterion, namely the criterion 
for truth1becomes a central feature in discussions relating to the "forms 
of knowledge". 
l . t P H Hirs , • • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 44. 
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Whilst it is claimed that each form of knowledge is unique, and 
that the various forms are irreducible to one another, there appear to 
be both concepts and logical elements which may be common to two or more 
forms. For example, the concepts of space and time belong to both human 
and physical sciences, and the laws of identity and non-contradiction 
would appear to be part of the logical structure of all forms of knowledge. 
But this proposal does not deny the uniqueness or irreducibility of any 
of the forms. Rather it supports the thesis that the forms are not 
independent of each other with regard to logical laws and fundamental 
concepts. This inter-relatedness of forms is stressed by Hirst • 
••• the dividing lines that can be drawn between 
different disciplines by means of the four suggested 
distinguishing marks are neither clear enough nor 
sufficient for demarcating the whole world of modern 
knowledge as we know it • 1 
Thus numerous conceptual and logical elements, as well as inter-
relations involving these elements, may be shared between the various 
forms. But given that the fundamental elements of knowledge are true 
propositions, then these propositions can be distinguished from one another 
by the different kinds of truth criteria involved. Alternatively, every 
concept has criteria for its application, which ir.clude the truth criteria f 0 r 
any proposition in which the concept may be used. 
It should be noted that in subsequent discussions of the article 
under consideration, Hirst makes the following comment: 
If my original thesis has appeared to many too strong 
in claiming the existence of knowledge in all the seven 
different forms, it being doubted whether there are 
truth criteria in some of these areas, it has also been 
considered too strong in claiming unique concepts and 
logical structure for each form • 2 
The fourth characteristic suggested relates to the methodology to be 
employed in assessing true propositions. But, as Hirst comments later, 
l . t P H Hirs , . • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P.·, 
2 
op. cit., p. 89. 
1974, p. 44. 
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These differences in methodology certainly mark out 
important differences in the pursuit of knowledge in 
the distinguishable forms, and are therefore most 
important in education and research. But they do not 
themselves add anything to the strictly logical 
distinctions which mark out possible forms of knowledge 
and I have therefore not referred to them in later 
writing which has concentrated solely on the logical 
distinctions .1 
I now wish to briefly examine the truth criteria as they may apply 
to each of the suggested forms of knowledge, and to consider, in the 
first instance, that of mathematics. In the original paper it is stated 
that 
But 
Each form, then, has distinctive expressions that are 
testable against experience in accordance with particular 
criteria that are peculiar to the form .2 
the statements of pure mathematics are not verified 
or falsified by reference to the external world • 
••• Mathematics is essentially deductive .3 
The difficulties highlighted by these conflicting statements are to some 
extent resolved if the following statement of Hirst and Peters is considered: 
The truths of formal logic and mathematics involve 
concepts that pick out relations of a general 
abstract kind, where deducibility within an axiom 
system is the particular test for truth .4 
Hence it is being claimed that the particular test against experience 
for mathematical propositions is deducibility. Given any deductive system 
in mathematics, which is necessarily deduced from a given set of axioms 
or postulates, it follows that these axioms cannot be considered to be 
propositions, but must be taken, along with their constituent concepts, 
as fundamental concepts of the form. 
l v Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 89. 
2
op. cit., p. 44. 
3 Woods, R.G. and Barrow, R.St.c., An Introduction·to Philosophy of Education, 
Methuen and Co. Ltd.~ 1975, p. 31. 
4 
' t P H d P t R S Hirs , •• an e ers, •• , The Logic of Education, O.U.P., 1970, p. 63. 
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According to Hospers 
A given proposition within a deductive system (including 
a system of geometry) is analytic in relation to the 
premises p, q, r, ••• from which it is deduced: that is, 
If p, q, r, ••• ,then x is analytic, it would be self-
contradictory to deny it if the reasoning is valid .1 
However, if the above conclusion that the propositions of a deductive 
system are analytic and knowable a priori is accepted, then this must be 
reconciled with Hirst's later statement which is made in defence of his 
position regarding the separatedness, and qence the truth criteria of his 
seven forms of knowledge, namely that 
The concepts of mathematics and those of space, time 
and causality that Kant considers a priori, manifestly 
have enormous stability. Yet these are historical 
products, and we now recognize that they do not have 
the unlimited application in our experience that Kant 
thought... They are no doubt a measure of the stab-
ility and near universality of very significant features 
in human nature and the human situation .2 
In this case Hirst is not denying that the propositions of mathematics 
as deduced are analytic and knowable a priori. His concern is with whether 
or not it is possible , to, know the concepts of mathematics a priori. 
That is, the possibility of a universal deductive system of mathematics 
from which all mathematical propositions could be deduced is being 
questioned. 
Whilst for mathematics the phrase "testable against experience" may 
have to be stipulated to mean "being deducible from certain axioms" in 
order to satisfy Hirst's third criterion for a form of knowledge, physical 
sciences have at their disposal refined experimental techniques and skills 
which enable predictions made on the basis of hypotheses to be tested. 
These procedures exemplify the notion of testability against experience for 
the physical sciences, and support the claim that they constitute a form 
of knowledge.' 
l Hospers, J.H. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 
R.K.P., 1967, p. 198. 
2Hirst, P.H. Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, 
p. 94. 
·-
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The third form of knowledge which Hirst proposes is that of the 
"human sciences". It is assumed that this would include psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, economics, and so on. Now it could be argued 
that these disciplines employ their own concepts, and to a lesser extent 
that each ~as a distinct logical structure. But the testing of hypotheses 
in these subjects against experience does not appear to be possible at 
this stage. Hirst's defense of his position in this case is not convincing. 
He states that 
In distinguishing forms of knowledge, it is the forms 
of objective judgement that we now have which I have 
been seeking to separate. If the thesis is correct, 
there are some seven types of discourse in which 
objectivity is at present seriously claimed. In some 
of these this objectivity might be well articulated, 
and the agreement in judgements very precise and clear. 
In others, it might be much less precise and not well 
characterized. If the ways in which words can be related 
to experience expressing such judgements can be various 
and complex, and no one formula can be asserted as the only 
valid case, there is nothing surprising in that. We can 
only explore the claims that are made .1 
Any proposal that literature and fine arts are forms of knowledge 
will give rise to difficulties relating to the application of the logical 
criteria of a form of knowledge similar to those difficlties already 
discussed for the human sciences. But, as before, it is the problems 
associated with the requirement for testability against experience which 
appear to be fundamental. In later writings Hirst seeks to eliminate 
any such problems by supporting a "propositional" theory of art, in which 
the observable features (of art) are used as symbols, 
have meaning, can be seen as making artistic state-
ments and judged true or false just as words and 
sentences can be used to make scientific statements .2 
It is furthermore claimed that the term "statement" rather than 
"proposition" should be used in order that the particularity of these 
considerations may be emphasised. Such particularity, it is suggested, 
arises both from the nature of artistic knowledge and the criteria of 
l ' t P H Hirs , • • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 95. 
2 
op. cit., p. 152. 
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truth which are to be applied to artistic statements. In contrast the 
judgement of whether or not a particular proposition relating to, for 
example, a particular painting was true or false will be made according 
to those general criteria of truth which apply to all propositions sub-
sumed under a particular epistemological theory. 
We are dealing with the claim that art is a unique form of knowledge 
and this claim is based on characterizing artistic knowledge as non-
referential knowledge. Within this theory it is maintained that the 
symbols of art do not have meaning because they refer to objects, states 
of affairs, etc. which exist independently of these symbols and are known 
independently of these symbols. That is, the symbols are logically 
independent of the knowledge conveyed by them. In support of these 
proposals Hirst claims for the refe:::-ential view of knowledge that 
works of art are in this way about something that 
exists beyond themselves, and immense difficulties 
have come from trying to identify these existents ••• 
Mathematical symbols have on this view been seen as 
referring to objectively existing mathematical 
entities •1 
But on a non-referential view of knowledge meaning arises from the public 
use of symbols in particular ways. And the 
very creation of a symbol system pre-supposes the 
idea of truth as to when the symbols apply and when 
they do not .2 
And moreover truth 
is a fundamental notion whose relationships to 
other fundamental notions can be indicated, but 
beyond that we can only say something about the 
conditions under which it can arise .3 
Now if truth is to be considered as an absolute notion then we should 
ask in what w~y(s) there are logical parallels between making judgments as 
' 
1 . p Hirst, .H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, 
2 
op. cit., p. 158. 
3 
op. cit., p. 159. 
R.K.P., 1974, p. 155. 
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to whether a mathematical statement is true, or, for example, a moral 
statement is true. If possible, it would seem justifiable to consider 
art as a form of knowledge. Thus uniqueness of art as a form of know-
ledge would imply that statements in art would be irreducible to state-
ments in any of the other forms of knowledge. Admittedly, the arts do 
presuppose other areas of knowledge just as science may presuppose a 
knowledge of mathematics, but this does not establish that works of art 
are reducible to other forms of statement anymore than science is 
reducible to mathematics. 
Hirst extends this thesis of non-referential knowledge to religious 
and moral considerations when he suggests that the arts and religion 
are only forms of knowledge in so far as they 
••• involve expressions that have the features of 
true propositions. We certainly do not talk of the 
arts and religion as being cognitive, as providing 
distinctive types of knowledge. Whether this is 
justifiable and there is a form of knowledge in the 
arts, depends upon whether or not artistic works 
themselves have features parallel to those of 
propositions with related objective tests • 1 
But it is the notion of testability which remains questionable, particularly 
as it relates for example, to religious and moral knowledge or 
literature and the fine arts. In the case of religion what kind of 
'experience' may be used to test statements such as "God exists" or "Man_ 
has an immortal soul"? Is this difficulty because religious statements 
require a different type of test, or is it because it is not possible to 
apply any kind of test for such statements? 
It seems, therefore, that Hirst has not succeeded in establishing 
that 'knowledge' can be subdivided in the manner he suggests. This 
rejection of Hirst's proposals is supported by the following quotations: 
(a) it is an historical accident that some subjects 
are called disciplines ••• we unthinkingly 
continue this tradition by learning to use the 
name 'discipline' only for certain subjects ••• 
1Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 87. 
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until pressed to consider whether some never-
called disciplines are disciplines .1 
(b) We have surveyed some of the most prominent 
candidates for the role of characteristically 
historical mode of explanation: and we have 
found that they conform essentially to one or 
the other of our two basic types of scientific 
explanation .2 
(c) Thus words like "history", "physics" and 
"mathematics" are not just names of bodies of 
knowledge, in the sense of sets of true 
propositions; they are, if anything, the names. 
of approaches to facts of generally different 
kinds. At a certain level, perhaps, we cannot 
ever say that; distinctions between subjects 
tend to break down, they become an administrative 
matter only, or a question merely of the differ-
erences in the background of interests on the part 
of those who are concerned with them .3 
Finally it should be noted that whilst in 1965 Hirst considered the 
forms of knowledge to comprise mathematics, physical sciences, human 
sciences, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy and moral 
knowledge, in 1969 history was amalgamated with the human sciences4 , and 
in 1970 history and the human sciences disappear with religion, literature 
and the fine arts, and moral knowledge remaining with the provision that 
"whether or not there are objective grounds for what is asserted (in 
religion) is ••• · a matter on which much more has yet to be said"5, and a 
new form makes its appear~:cce as "awareness and understanding of our own 
mind and other people's minds"6. 
1
soltis, J.F., An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts, 
Addison-Wesley, Mass,, 1968, p. 23. 
2Nidditch, P.H. (Ed.}, The Philosophy of Science, o.u.P., 1968, p. 54. 
3 Peters, R. S. 
4 
' t H Hirs , P. • , 
(Ed.), The Concept of Education, R.K.P., 1967. 
Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 1, No.22, 1969, p. 151. 
5Hirst, P.H.and Peters, R.S., The Logic of Education, R.K.P., 1970, pp 63, 64. 
6
op. cit., p. 64. 
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"Planning and practical conduct of a liberal education". 
The final section of the article under consideration briefly outlines 
the real issues or themes in the planning and conduct of a liberal education. 
Within this section four such issues receive detailed consideration. These 
interrelated themes are: 
(a) the aims and desirable outcomes of liberal 
education; 
(b) the interrelational aspects of the various fo:qns 
of knowledge; 
(c) the selection of syllabus content; 
(d) teaching methods and learning processes. 
Now it is claimed that: 
(i) What is being sought is, first, sufficient immersion 
in the concepts, logic and criteria of the discipline 
for a person to come to know the distinctive way in 
which it 'works' by pursuing these in particular cases, 
and then sufficient generalization of these over the 
whole range of the discipline so that his experience 
begins to be widely structured in this distinc~ive way .1 
(ii) That to provide for the comprehensive development of 
the mind through the acquisition of knowledge samples 
of each form of knowledge must be chosen. 
(iii) It should be ensured that students come to understand 
the major achievements in each area of study. 
(iv) It will also include some indication of the relations 
between these forms where these overlap and their 
significance in the major fields of knowledge, partic-
ularly the practical fields that have been developed • 2 
It is from these claims that many major difficulties relating to 
the practical implementation of a liberal education, as proposed, emerge. 
The lack of specification by Hirst of objective criteria for the various 
selective processes essential to the above make it difficult to meet 
the above claims. For example, criteria for determining the level 
1ttirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curricuium, R.K.P., 1974, p. 47. 
2 
op. cit., p. 48. 
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appropriate to both "sufficient immersion" and "sufficient generalization" 
are not detailed. As before, both the selection of suitable samples of each 
form of knowledge, and of the major achievements of each area of study 
entail selection criteria, and, as before, these are not given. In the 
'absence of such objective means of selection, decisions relating to the 
selection of syllabus content will inevitably relate to a 8Ub~ective_ 
evaluation of the various components or the syllabus, and hence a value-
laden justification for their inclusion. Attempts to eliminate, or at 
least exercise some modicum of control on syllabus content decisions, are 
usually based upon attempts to achieve concensus amongst varying numbers 
of "subject experts" through, for example, committees and survey procedures. 
There is no logical basis on which it may be contended that such syllabus 
construction enhances the prospects of providing for, and indeed, achieving 
a liberal education. Alternative bases for selection mentioned by Hirst 
are historical growth, usefulness, demands of higher specialist education 
and psychological principles. However, whilst Hirst does not detail any 
of the criteria discussed above, he clearly recognizes that there is a need 
to do so, and indicates his support for research so focussed. 
Throughout this section of the paper several references are made to 
the interrelated aspects of each of the various forms of knowledge. It 
is, for example, proposed that a syllabus should not be considered in 
terms of information and isolated skills, but on the basis of the inter-
related aspects of the various forms. It is claimed that the study of 
these will lead, in the first instance, to the a€quisition of the complex 
conceptual schemes and of the arts and techniques of each discipline, and, 
ultimately, to an understanding of experience in many ways. However, an 
additional requirement is that the formal curriculum should provide for 
"some indication of the relations between the forms where these overlap111 • 
(i) What are the indicators of such relations? 
(ii) Are they empirical or logical relations? 
1Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 48. 
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(iii) What are the basic concepts involved in such relations, 
and does this imply that there may be a set of basic 
concepts underlying all the forms of knowledge? 
(iv) What are some examples of such relations? 
Apart from stating that these relations are particularly important 
when considering questions in moral education, Hirst does not give any 
examples of such relations. This is, perhaps, not surprising as at a 
later stage he comments that 
we have as yet not begun to understand the complex 
interrelations of the different forms of knowledge 
themselves, for they do not only have unique features 
but common features too, and in addition one discipline 
often makes extensive use of the achievements of another 1 
Whilst he admits the possibility of planning a liberal education 
around certain fields of knowledge which could be either theoretical or 
practical, Hirst claims that such a procedure has the inherent danger 
that the liberal education as such may be lost sight of and the field of 
knowledge pursued as an end in itself. This claim is made on the basis 
that the skills and techniques developed through such studies may be 
valuable, and perhaps essential,· to that part of an individual's total 
education other than a liberal education. This danger appears to be 
particularly evident in cases where a practically-oriented field of 
knowledge is used as a basis for the curriculum. Indeed, if the arts 
and techniques associated with such a field are highly specifiable, then 
a liberal education based upon this field may easily become nothing more 
than vocational training. 
Within this section of the paper very little comment is made in 
relation to the teaching of the various forms, and the associated learning 
by students. Perhaps the most significant comment is that 
the belief that inherent logical structure of a 
discipline, or branch of a discipline, necessarily 
1Hirst, P.H. Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 52. 
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determines exactly what and how the subject is to 
be· taught and learnt 1, 
is frequently evident in syllabus planning. But such a belief reflects 
a confusion between the logical characteristics of a subject and the 
psychological processes involved in the learning of the subject. The 
latter are surely not prescribed in any temporal or other order by the 
logical characteristics of a subject. 
l ' t P H Hirs , •• , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 52. 
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SECTION B 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECONDARY CURRICULUM 
The Curriculum 
As Hirst considers that the curric.ulum ought to be based upon the 
forms of knowledge, and, by his own analysis, the structure and organisa-
tion of knowledge is universal and hence not culturally founded, the 
secondary curriculum would be 'non-cultural' in the sense of being trans-
cultural. Thus the knowledge content of the secondary curriculum is not 
dependent upon various cultures or sub-cultures, and in educating we must 
make it possible, for example, through secondary education, for all 
members of the society to have accesR to the same kinds of knowledge, i.e. 
to knowledge drawn from the various forms of knowledge proposed by Hirst. 
Hence for Hirst the traditional secondary curriculum with the inclusion 
of both moral and religious education would apparently suffice for all 
students attending schools at this level of education. That is, the aims 
of such a secondary education will be the same for all pupils regardless 
of cultural, social or psychological factors. But this is not to say that 
such factors are not relevant to the means of attaining these ainls i.e. 
to content and teaching methods. Hirst's answer to the challenge that 
experience has demonstrated that it does not seem possible to attain the 
same aims with pupils of, for example, different intellectual abilities 
rests upon his contention that, as yet, we have not been able to learn, 
through empirical investigation, sufficient about the ways in which children 
learn, and hence how teachers should teach, to facilitate the universal 
attainment of such aims. 
A further criticism of Hirst's proposals in relation to school 
curricula, and, it seems to me, to those which appear to include secondary-
school curricula, may be based upon his insistence that not only must 
objectives be'made clear before the notion of a curriculum can be con-
sid~red, but that these objectives should be specified in such a manner 
that they may be given public symbolic representation,which is objective 
in the sense that it has agreed meanings. Even if the thesis that there 
are such forms of knowledge is accepted, all forms, except perhaps math-
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ematics and the physical sciences, are not sufficiently developed in terms 
of their public symbolism to permit such specificity of objectives. 
Also, should all secondary education be concerned with the develop-
ment of the mind as is Hirst's contention? Should not, for example, 
schools be concerned with manual arts and practical activities? Hirst 
would not necessarily exclude such activities from tbe secondary curricu~um, 
but rather than justify such activities in terms of their own educational 
worth he would see their inclusion as worthwhile in that all such activities 
could be considered as public expressions of knowledge, and hence that the 
students' participation in such activities would enhance their understanding 
of the forms of knowledge. This is not to suggest that Hirst would support 
the inclusion of elements in the secondary curriculum for purely vocational 
purposes. The inclusion of such elements could be justified only if their 
entailed activities were clearly based upon knowledge as expressed in its 
various forms. Thus, for example, woodwork may find a place in the 
secondary curriculum only if the activities entailed by the curriculum in 
woodwork are public expressions of knowledge drawn from one or more of the 
forms of knowledge.· Hence woodwork.activities which enhanced understanding 
in mathematics and the physical sciences would apparently be permissible. 
But it does seem unlikely that this is the sense in which such subjects 
are taught and that Hirst would be in favour of their retention in the 
secondary curriculum. 
For Lawton1 the curriculum ought to closely correspond with Hirst's 
forms of knowledge with the inclusion of 
(i) Mathematics; 
(ii} Physical and biological sciences; 
(iii} Humanities and the social sciences (including history, 
geography, classical studies, social studies, 
literature, film,·T.V., and religion studies}; 
(iv} Expressive and creative arts; and 
(v} Moral education. 
1Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the curriculum, R.K.P., 1975 
"' 
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whilst each of the above would not necessarily assume equal 
importance, integration is attempted by the inclusion of a sixth component 
which Lawton1 refers to as "interdisciplinary work", And an essential 
feature of such a curriculum is that every student should reach a minimum 
level of understanding in each of the five forms or faculties indicated 
above. For 
Without an insistence on a basic minimum understanding 
of the forms of knowledge which we regard as important, 
however, talk of equality of opportunity is no more than 
a sham and leads almost inevitably to non-academic courses 
for life-adjustment i.e. the kinds of courses planned for 
"less able" children, ostensibly to prepare them for the 
"world of work" and social relationships, but containing 
little or no worthwhile knowledge • 2 
Lawton's proposals for a "common culture"3 curriculum are sim:ilar 
to those of J.P. White4• Whilst White also bases his curriculum on Hirst's 
forms of knowledge he not only does not regard all forms of knowledge of 
equal importance in the development of understanding, but also distinguishes 
between kinds of knowledge which are essential to the production of under-
standing and those which are not. Thus in his compulsory curriculum 
humanities is to precede science, for example, and painting pictures, 
learning foreign languages, writing poetry are optional rather than 
mandatory requirements. 
,-; 
Hirst's criticism that not all pupils are capable of benefiting 
from such a curriculum is not accepted by Lawton5 , who argues that although 
this is a commonly held belief, it is, in fact, a retention from the 
nineteenth century division of education into elitist and elementary 
categories. In addition, it is argued that both psychological and socio-
logical research have tended to accept this assumption as evidenced by· 
their concentration on methods and explanations relating to failure rather 
than upon how children learn. Possible evidence for this emphasis may be 
1 Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1973. 
2 
op. cit., p. 89. 
3 
op. cit., p. 90. 
4White, J.P., Towards a ComEulsory Curriculum, R.K.P., 1973 
5 Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975. 
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the high priority given by educators, and supporting professional agencies, 
to the identification of norm-referenced criteria for the prediction of 
academic attainment, and by implication academic failure. Typical of 
such criteria are the various intelligence quotients which have been devel-
oped, and which were used prior to about 1960 for example, for selecting 
those students who could enter Tasmariian high schools. In contrast there 
appears to have been less concern with xhe development of criteria, which 
refer specifically to individuals and, in particular, to the factors 
pertinents to each of these individuars learning. 
A further criticism which may be made of "Hirst-type" curricula, 
and which is discussed by Lawton1 , is that it is not possible, in 
practice, to organize such a common curriculum to cater for a wide range 
of pupil abilityo Lawton argues that such criticism should not relate 
to the curriculum but rather to the way(s) in which the necessary teaching 
on this curriculum should be organised. It is claimed, on this basis, 
that whole class teaching, as widely practised in Tasmanian secondary 
schools, does not facilitate such teaching, and that much more flexible 
arrangements are needed. "Open-space" teaching as occurs in Tasmanian 
schools is one such attempt at flexible organisation, although such 
organisation may be more usually justified in terms of the facilitation 
of socialization rather than the development of knowledge and understanding 
.-
through the teaching of a common curriculum. 
For Hirst specifying the knowledge to be contained within a curriculum 
entails the selection of representative samples from all of the forms of 
knowledge. For Bantock selection from all of the ava~lable knowledge 
of the particular culture is necessary. In either case the knowledge 
content of the curriculum so developed will be dependent upon the selection 
criteria used. If the selection criteria used to develop a common curriculum 
from the forms of knowledge were completely objective, in the sense that they 
were universally applicable and unchanging in time, then this curriculum 
would not be culturally dependent. On this basis Hirst's claims and those 
of Bantock with respect to the knowledge content of a common curriculum 
are inconsistent. It is, however, at least logically possible for a 
particular culture that the sets of selective criteria adopted by both 
1Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975. 
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Hirst and Bantock are equivalent sets and therefore generate identical 
common curricula. Considered from within this culture the claims of 
Hirst and Bantock in this regard would appear to be consistent. 
A further claim which may be made in relation to such a curriculum 
is that its adoption inevitably lowers standards and restricts the progress 
of the more intellectually-able pupils. Whilst Lawton admits that 
In some unstreamed situations, where teachers try to 
carry on traditional methods of teaching, it is almost 
certainly true that standards fall and bright pupils 
are held back • 1 
he also claims that 
The advantage of the conunon-culture individualized 
curriculum ••• is that all pupils can be allowed to 
work at their own pace and encouraged to go forward 
as fast as they possibly can • 2 
In general, therefore, Hirst would support the retention.of the 
traditional secondary curriculum patterns. This view is strongly rejected 
by G.H. Bantock who supports the development of a radically new curriculum 
pattern. Bantock's basis for such support rests upon his notion that the 
school curriculum should be a selection of the culture in which the school 
operates. In his Notes Towards the Definition-of Culture (1948) T.S. Eliot 
proposed that the retention of the most worthwhile aspects of culture was 
dependent upon the existence of a small, leisured class. Bantock, in 
concluding from his analysis of culture that there should be two kinds of 
curricula, appears to support Eliot's proposals. These curricula are 
1 
2 
(i) a high-culture curriculum for the small minority of 
students, who could be classified as academically-
minded, and 
{ii) a totally different curriculum with a substantial 
~non-literary content for the mafuses. 
Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the curriculum, R:K.P., 1975, p. 94. 
op. cit., p. 94. 
, .. 
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But whilst the difficulties in defining a Hirst-style curriculum 
are related to the lack of development of some of the forms of knowledge 
and an associated lack of specificity of selection criteria, Bantock's 
proposals are at least open to two somewhat similar criticisms. Firstly, 
his ideas clearly rest upon the assumption that it is possible to divide 
'culture' neatly into 'high' and 'low' categories and, secondly, he appears 
to be committed to the notion that it is possible, and presurnbaly desirable, 
to allocate human beings or groups of human beings to two corresponding and 
rigid categories. 
The reality is, I suggest, much more complex: the 
distinction between high.and mass culture is difficult 
to maintain consistently, and there is a great deal of 
overlap,l and 
Bantock's main fault consists of an inadequate analysis 
of culture, and especially that part of culture referred 
to as worthwhile knowledge • 2 
Thus, as is the case for curricula organised according to Hirst's 
analysis of knowledge, definitional difficulties arise through problems 
associated with the lack of specificity of the categories proposed for 
the structuring of knowledge for the curriculum, and with the selection 
of representative elements from these categories. 
For Bantock·, Hirst' s forms of knowledge are a consequence of the 
development of a high-culture, and the curriculum should not, therefore, 
as Hirst proposes, be determined by such forms and be common for all. For 
Hirst, Bantock's proposals for different kinds of curricula for different 
cultural groups indicate his failure to understand the transcultural nature 
of the fundamental structure of knowledge. 
However, Raymond Williams in "Culture and Society" (1958) and "The 
Long Revolution" (1961) proposes that, on the basis of his historical analysis 
of Western culture, there should be a common curriculum for children up to 
the age of si~teen years. He states that 
I would put down the following, as the minimum to 
1 Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975, p. 15. 
2
op. cit., p. 16. 
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aim at for every educationally normal child. 
(a) Extensive practice in the fundamental languages 
of English and Mathematics; 
(b) general knowledge of ourselves and our environ-
ment, taught at the secondary stage not as separate 
academic disciplines but as general knowledge drawn 
from the disciplines which clarify at a higher stage 
i.eo 
(i) Biology, psychology; 
(ii) Social history, law and political institutions, 
sociology, descriptive economics, geography 
including actual industry and trade; 
(iii)physics and chemistry; 
(c) history and criticism of literature, the visual arts, 
music, dramatic performance, landscape and architect-
ure; 
(d) extensive practice in democratic procedures, including 
meetings, negotiations, and the selection and conduct 
of leaders in democratic organisations. Extensive 
practice in the use of libraries, newspapers, magazines, 
radio and television programmes, and other sources of 
information, opinion and influences; 
(e) introduction to at least one other culture including its 
language, history, geography, institutions and arts, to 
be given in part by visiting and exchange 1 
Thus for Williams ideological and economic changes are seen as 
producing changes in the culture of a society. Secondary education systems, 
it is proposed, have yet to incorporate such changes and, indeed, "the logic 
of the situation is such that certain further.cultural changes ought to be 
anticipated by education". 2 In proposing the above common curriculum 
Williams recognizes the possibility that education, and in particular 
secondary curricula, may still be strongly influenced by class-based 
curricula traditions. Such an influence may be indicated by his emphasis 
upon each child acquiring a minimum level of competence in the use of the 
languages of mathematics and English as well as gaining a wide general 
knowledge. This emphasis within the curriculum src~7s _ the influence of 
traditional curricula for the "working-class". At the secondary level such 
curricula, at least in the early period of their use, would probably have 
reflected the· vocational needs of the members of this class. Bantock is not 
making the claim that education is to be determined by cultural background 
but that a conunon curriculum selected from a conunon culture may give rise 
to an education system which will produce a bette~ society. This claim 
1 Lawton, D., Class, Culture and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975, pp. 23, 24. 
2 't Op. CJ. o, p. 24. 
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contrasts clearly with Hirst's proposals which deny the possibility of 
cultural influences on the curriculum and justify a common curriculum, 
however, not in terms of a common culture, but on the basis of a universal 
and complete structuring of knowledge and upon the necessity of knowledge 
and understanding for the development of a rational mind. 
32. 
Curriculum Objectives 
Previous considerations of Hirst's views on the concept of a liberal 
education and on the structure of knowledge imply that a liberal secondary 
education would have the development of the characteristics of a rational 
mind by each of its pupils as the fundamental objective. 
If the acquisition of knowledge is logically basic 
for the development of a rational mind, and if the 
domain of knowledge consists of a limited number of 
different autonomous forms, the importance within 
the surriculum of the pursuit of knowledge is seen 
to be considerable and the significance of restrict-
ing the curriculum to certain areas carries inescap-
able results for the pupils .1 
However, adequate educational, and hence curriculum, planning would 
seem to demand not only the clear statement of general aims, and their 
translation into specific objectives, but also the description 'of each of 
these objectives in terms of the public forms of experience associated 
with them and of the relations between the objectives under consideration. 
-If by the term "curriculum" we mean a programme of activities which 
is planned so that pupils will attain by learning certain specifiable ends, 
then there cannot be a curriculum without objectives. That is, on the 
basis that "plan~ing" pre-supposes "having oojectives", planning is logical 
nonsense until the objectives have been specified. In supporting this 
view and condemning the use of "free-activity" periods in schools Hirst states 
It is, I think, therefore pure deception to regard 
such an activity as part of a curriculum if it is 
not structured to obtain certain specified objectives. 
If one re-defines what is meant by a curriculum to 
include this sort of random pursuit, that is to win 
only a verbal battle .2 
On Hirst's view, then, the logically most fundamen~al objectives of 
all are those-of the cognitive kind, and out of these all others must be 
developed. But there can be no experience or knowledge.without the 
acquisition of relevant concepts, and these concepts must be shared in the 
l ' t P H Hirs , • • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, pp. 27, 28. 
2 
op. cit., p. 4. 
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public world. Without such sharing we cannot attain objectivity. In 
addition to the sharing of concepts there must be public tests and criteria, 
and public agreement on the criteria for what is claimed to be known or 
understood. Hence objective judgements are not possible without a body of 
agreed concepts. The concepts of mathematics and those of time and space 
have enormous stability in the sense that they have apparently unchanging 
application in our experience, and have near universality in the width 
of this application. Judgements made within such relatively stable and 
universal conceptual schemes approach objectivity. Complete objectivity 
of judgement is attainable only when the body of agreed concepts within 
which the judgement is to be made are unchanging with time and universally 
applicable. Such judgements themselves are not matters of further agree-
ment. The "basic structure of objectives we are after must be one within 
that bcjy of concepts and related tests which man has so far developed11 • 1 
It is on this basis that Hirst's analysis implies rejection of the descrip-
tion of educational ends in terms of such notions as pupil "growth", 
"interests" or "needs". Such notions are global in their intentions in 
relation to pupils and, as well as presupposing certain standards and norms, 
cannot be publicly defined in terms of their exact content. 
A further categorization of educational objectives which has recently 
enjoyed a considerable measure of acceptance in Tasmanian secondary schools 
is that proposed by B.S. Bloom2 and his colleagues in the "Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives", and, in particular, the categorization which is 
ppplied to the cognitive, rather than the affective and psycho-motor 
domains. Included in the cognitive domain are, for example, such cate~or~es 
as a knowledge of specifics, which includes knowledge of particular items 
of information, of conventions, of terminology, of classifications, and so 
on. In addition, skills and abilities related to comprehension, transla-
tion, application, synthesis and analysis are proposed as categories of 
this domain. Now it seems probable that Hirst would approve of such an 
attempt to classify knowledge in that it provides for a diversity of possible 
, 
objectives all related to the acquisition of knowledge and in so doing 
lessens the possibility that objectives will be solely concerned with the 
1 Peters, R.S., The Logic of Education, R.K.P., 1970, p. 63. 
& Hirst, P.H. 
2 Bloom, B.S., et al,_ Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, McKay Co. Inc., 
New York, 1956 
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learning of facts. Such a categorization may also foster an awareness 
that objectives must, according to Hirst, be specifiable in terms of public 
modes of experience. But although this taxonomy may assist in the listing 
of educational objectives, it does not clarify the nature and structure of 
such objectives. It does not, for instance, clarify what is involved in 
a child understanding a simple proposition such as "Sir John Kerr is 
Governor-General of Australia". Not only, in this case, must the child 
be able to identify Sir John Kerr, but he must also understand what is 
meant by the term "Governor-General". What is more, if the child is to 
come to know this proposition he must surely know whether or not it is 
true. An analysis of the concept of knowledge, which is often used, is 
that a person A knows that a given proposition is true if 
three conditions are satisfied. These are 
(i) The truth-condition: p is true; 
(ii) The belief-condition: A believes that p is true; 
(iii)The evidence-condition: A has adequate evidence 
for believing that p is true. 
Bloom's analysis does not consider these, or any, neqessary, 
conditions for having knowledge. Hirst recognizes the first of the above 
conditions when he states that 
·it is quite impossible to learn facts, to know them 
as facts, without acquiring the basic concepts and 
the criteria for truth involved .1 
This is not to say that, in this case, a secondary education should 
be concerned only with intellectual development, but that all other forms 
of development with which education may be concerned are fundamentally 
dependent upon a student's progress in the development of rational under-
standing. Thus, Hirst suggests, 
although all the possible or justifiable objectives 
of ~ducation are not themselves explicitly develop-
ments of mind, it is, I suggest, by their connection 
with such specific developments that other objectives 
l ' t P H Hirs , • • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 19. 
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have their place and their justification in education 
at all .1 
Likewise it could be maintained that any curriculum which underplays the 
value of cognitive objectives will not only be limiting students in their 
cognitive development but will also impede those developments which pre-
suppose cognitive achievement. On these grounds Hirst would appear to 
reject the anti-intellectualism which characterizes some contemporary 
movements in education. This position is maintained irrespective of the 
ability of the child and against any suggestions that we should retreat 
for the academically less-able students to curricula which emphasise 
arts and practi9al activities. For all students Hirst contends, as he 
argues in his paper entitled "The nature and structure of curriculum 
objectives"2, curricula must be planned to enable the mastery, by the 
students, of the appropriate symbolism of each of the forms studied. What, 
therefore, becomes crucial for education, and in particular for secondary 
education, is the selection of the range of the cognitive objectives to 
be included in the curriculum. 
However, Hirst's proposals do not entail any principles whereby such 
a selection is facilitated. Consequently such principles have to be imported 
from outside structures and criteria put forward by Hirst. Perhaps, in 
broad terms, the principle to be imported is, ~n question form, "To what 
ends is the pursuit of this activity desirable?" That is, a utilitarian 
principle is invoked. In framing curricula one cannot simply ignore society, 
particularly when one considers the extent to which practical problems, 
such as the management and use of resources, may influence the choice of 
curriculum objectives. A curriculum may be considered to reflect an 
educational theory to the development of which not only philosophers, but 
historians, psychologists and sociologists can contribute. Curricula are 
surely sensitive to time and content and there is, on this view, no absolute 
and externally valid curriculum. That is, 
~ 
Ultimately curriculum decisions, like educational 
decisions generally, rest upon individuals' systems 
1Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P.·, 1974, p. 19. 
2
op. cit. pp. 16-29. 
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of value and these, varying from time and place, 
will bring about variations in the curriculum 
practices based on them •1 
In discussing curriculum objectives for secondary education some 
consideration of the recent changes in curriculum content and emphasis as 
demonstrated by modifications made by the Schools Board of Tasmania to 
subject syllabi, the range of subjects offered and the assessment procedures 
for these, would seem to be of interest. 
The Schools Board-of Tasmania,constituted in 1944, was required, in 
accordance with the Education Act, 1944, to devise and administer new 
systems of awarding school certificates for secondary education. In 1946 
the Board instituted a "four-year course of academic secondary education 
leading to the Schools Board Certificate". 2 This certificate demanded a 
level of achievement in "basic and optional subjects after a four-year 
course of general education113 • At this stage secondary schools could choose 
between a school-based, but state supervised, accrediting system and a 
state-wide system of external examinations. 
In 1960, in order to accommodate for the impact of the change of the 
previously academically selective high schools to secondary schools with a 
comprehensive intake of pupils, measures to provide for a wider range of 
certification by the Schools Board of Tasmania were introduced. This con-
sisted of a basic certificate awarded to any student who completed an 
approved course and passed at least one subject. 
This certificate was endorsed "B" for those who gained 
at least seven points, or endorsed "A" for those who 
gained at least seven points, including at least one 
point in English and passes in two two-point basic 
subjects ,4 
f 
Points were to be awarded according to the subject and level of pass 
obtained. 
1 Woods, R.G. and Barrow, R.St.c., An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education, Methuen, 1975; p. 41. 
2
schools Board of Tasmania, School Certificate Manual for 1976, 1975, p. 5. 
3 Op o ci t • I p • 5 • 
4 
op. cit., p. 5. 
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In 1969 the Schools Board of Tasmania conducted, for the first time, 
the Higher School Certification Examination, this examination replacing the 
Matriculation examination as previously conducted by the University of 
Tasmania. At the same time the Schools Board Certificate was replaced by 
the School Certificate. 
The subjects for this certificate may be taken at 
various levels and a wide choice is available to 
cater for different levels of ability and interest 
The certificates will be awarded as a result of a 
system of regional moderation which has been developed 
to ensure comparability of standards between scho~ls • 1 
Now the original four-year courses as proposed by the Schools Board of 
Tasmania in 1946 gave status to both "basic" and "optional" components of 
this course. Whilst the basic aspect of such a course may appear as evidence 
for a universally valid curriculum for all secondary study it seems likely 
that it did not arise from the recognition of any particular epistemological 
theory. Social demand, particularly for basic literacy and numeracy, 
strengthened by a heritage of belief in the value of achieving standards 
in certain areas of study appears to be a more probable justification for 
the inclusion of a basic component in all curricula. That is, the basic 
subjects included in the secondary curriculum reflected social demand rather 
than any fundamentality of knowledge structure~ The inclusion of "optional" 
subjects in the curriculum probably indicated a recognition of practical 
activity as part of education. Whilst Hirst may agree with the inclusion 
of such activity in the curriculum for him the justification for their 
inclusion would have to be based upon them being designed to enhance the 
students' understanding of the forms of knowledge. However, it does not 
seem apparent that any such justification was employed, the inclusion of such 
options being based upon a recognition that children may be more easily 
motivated and may learn more readily, in some instances, through practical 
activities. Typically such optional subjects included Mathematics (Advanced) , 
German, Latin, Art, Home Arts and Crafts, Shorthand, Commerce and Typing. 
The differentiation of these into academically worthwhile and socially useful 
categories is obvious evidence of two strands of social demand - the first 
being very much concerned with the preservation of standards and the second 
1 Schools Board of Tasmania, School Certificate Manual for 1976, 1975, p. 5. 
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supporting an economically-based society. 
Furthermore, the Schools Board was at this stage concerned with a 
standard level of achievement for general secondary education which was to 
be measured according to subject-based standards. Details obtainable 
from manuals published by the Schools Board during this period do not 
suggest that the criteria by which such standards were measured were directly 
related to the fundamental concepts or internal logic of the particular 
subjects. Perhaps the greatest influence in the selection of these criteria 
was the order in which knowledge and standards had historically developed 
in the subject. 
The wider range of certification introduced in 1960 may be seen as 
an attempt to recognize the wider range of intellectual ability and the 
diversity of pupil interests now found in the recently established compre-
hensive high schools. 
The introduction of school-based assessment in 1969 would appear to 
be an acknowledgment that curricula should, at least to some extent, be 
socially dependent. Whilst the formal curriculum of high schools was 
necessarily composed of an amalgamation of subjects selected from a range 
of subjects prescribed by the Schools Board of Tasmania, teachers within 
these schools were encouraged to develop their own interpretation of these 
subject syllabi,·and, consequently, to develop assessment procedures based 
on these interpretations. In this way attempts to recognize both fundamental 
structur~l features of knowledge and social factors in the determination of 
curricula were made. The continuation of such attempts and the failure to 
recognize Hirst's proposals may be evidenced by statements relating to 
curriculum objectives for secondary mathematics as given in the School 
Certificate Manual for 1976. It is stated that 
All mathematics taught at the secondary level must 
be based upon the collection of concepts and 
experiences which a pupil has amassed ~t the primary 
le~el .1 
Whilst this statement may be seen as an acknowledgement of a cumulative 
knowledge structure for mathematics it is not clear as to whether or not 
1schools Board of Tasmania, School Certificate Manual for 1976, 1975, p.125. 
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this structure corresponds to that arising from the logical order of , 
mathematics. The statement may, for instance, be based upon the assumpt-
ion of a particular learning theory which specifies that mathematical 
concepts must be acquired in a given order. 
Hirst's requirement that mathematics as a form of knowledge must have 
a characteristic logical structure is supported by the statement that 
At all levels the emphasis should be on presenting 
the subjects as a logical arrangement of knowledge 
gained through scientific enquiry. 1 
But if such knowledge is to be gained through "scientific enquiry" then 
it may be assumed that the skills and techniques, which Hirst maintains 
are characteristic of science as a form of knowledge, may be used to acquire 
knowledge in mathematics. This assumption would contradict Hirst's con-
tentions relating to the irreducibility of the forms of knowledge. 
On the basis of his analysis of knowledge, and his interpretation of 
this analysis in relation to ~urriculum objectives, Hirst proposes that a 
universally valid knowledge curriculum is possible. Such a curriculum could 
be stated in terms of a set or sets of objectives, which were universally 
applicable to all students regardless of such factors as~for instance, their 
academic ability and social backgrounds. Such a curriculum is evidently 
not envisaged for mathematics as it is suggested that the end-points of 
the level I syllabus should be chosen to suit the needs and abilities of 
these students. Hirst may, however, reject the assumption in ~is 
suggestion that different pupils have different needs and that the content 
and objectives of the curriculum should be determined by the abilities of 
those who are studying the curriculum. Indeed he may maintain that the 
development of the mind through the acquisition of knowledge is a universal 
need of pupils. Further opposition to a universal curriculum is expressed 
in the statement that 
The end-points to be reached by the pupil should be 
adjusted to suit his interests, maturity, rate of 
1
schools Board of Tasmania, School Certificate Manual for 1976, 1975, p. 125. 
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learning and his ability to make abstractions and deal 
with complex ideas .l 
It is further suggested that the curriculum in mathematics should 
emphasise 
••• certain knowledge, skills, understanding and methods 
which support the learning of other disciplines, and 
provide for the social competence of future citizens • 2 
Whilst Hirst may not reject the possibility of knowledge gained 
through the study of one form of knowledge being applied to the study of 
another form, his rejection of any concept of a transfer of training involv-
ing the development of abilities and skills, which are applicable to 
several different forms, suggests that he would not be in agreement with 
the proposed emphasis. 
But perhaps the clearest recognition of Hirst's analysis is given in 
the following quotation which refers to the objectives for a trial 
syllabus in mathematics: 
•••• to acquaint pupils with the unique features of 
mathematics which identify the subject as a discipline 
in its own right and to see that the fundamental 
patterns of thinking involved in this subject make a 
contribution to the whole of intellectual development .3 
Whilst the above may indicate that there is not complete recognition 
of mathematics as a unique form of knowledge, an examination of the aims and 
objectives given for othe! subjects as quoted in the School Certificate 
Manual shows very little evidence of other forms of knowledge being con-
sidered. On this basis it may be proposed that the curriculum for Tasmanian 
secondary schools is not based upon Hirst's analysis of all knowledge into 
autonomous forms, nor, indeed, would it appear to be based upon any con-
sistently applied analysis of knowledge relating to a universal structuring 
of knowledge. 
1
schools Board of Tasmania, School Certificate Manual for 1976, 1975, p. 125. 
2 
op. cit., p. 143. 
3 
op. cit., p. 145. 
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Curriculum Integration 
One trend in recent curriculum developments appears to be the 
movement towards "integrated" curricula. Such a movement apparently 
compl~ents curriculum proposals such as those advanced by G.H. Bantock 
wherein cultural factors other than those pertaining directly to knowledge 
are acknowledged. Consequently, social aspects of the culture become 
important in the curriculum. Conversely, curricula based upon Hirst's 
concept of autonomous forms of knowledge would not be considered to be 
"integrated". But when is a curriculum integrated? 
Many secondary schools in Tasmania still retain curricula which are 
organised under different subjects with each such subject being taught 
for its own ends. Although this practice may simplify overall school 
management, it is not necessarily educationally desirable for the students 
concerned and could not be considered to provide an integrated curriculum. 
Nor should the notion of the integration of a curriculum be confused with 
those ideas underlying the "integrated day" as featured in some infant 
schools. The fact that pupils plan the time span for, and order of activit-
ies occurring within such a day, does not necessarily imply an integrated 
curriculum. 
Moreover, if, as Hirst claims, 
The whole thesis of the irreducibility of different 
forms of knowledge involves the claim that their 
concepts and truth criteria are of fundamentally 
different kinds and their unification under concepts 
of one kind is deniede l 
then it is logically possible to provide for an integrated curriculum 
within a particular form by organising such a course around a particular 
set of concepts from that form. To provide for an integrated curriculum 
encompassing all forms of knowledge would entail proposing a unity of 
knowledge unified by a fundamental set of concepts common to all forms. 
Clearly Hirst's thesis does not include such a proposal, but this does 
not deny that there are logical relationships between the various forms 
l ' t H Hirs , P. • , Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975, p. 137a 
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of knowledge. In many cases the concepts of one form may pre-suppose 
those of another form and in this sense there are logical relationships 
between these forms. For instance, religious and moral concepts may 
pre-suppose concepts of the physical world and hence it may be contended 
that there are logical relationships between, say, the physical sciences 
and moral and religious knowledge. Thus the development through studies 
in religion of a concept of God may be dependent upon the prior develop-
ment in the physical sciences, for instance, of those concepts which may 
underlie a concept of the universe. This does not mean, however, that 
the concepts of the latter forms of knowledge are in any way reducible 
to those of the physical sciences. Similarly that true statements in one 
form pre-suppose those in other forms does not mean that these types of 
truths are mutually reducible. For instance, the truth of statements 
about a person's state of mind may pre-suppose the truth of statem3nts 
about his physical health. According to Hirst this does not mean that 
there are common criteria through which the truth or falsity of statements 
in psychology, as a human science, and statements in physiology, as a 
physical science, may be assessed. 
The above notion of the irreducibility of forms, and the entailed 
consequences of this notion, is itself dependent upon the assumption that 
both the range and identity of the autonomous forms of knowledge has been 
undeniably established. Hirst bases this necessary assumption upon the 
claim that "concepts and truth criteria of a fundamentally different kind 
do not seem to be readily forthcoming". 1 However, in this context Hirst 
does not advance convincing evidence or logical argument to support this 
claim and, in the light of his admission that there are different "levels" 
to which the various forms have so far developed, the counter-claim that it 
is this differentiation between the forms that has so far precluded the 
identification of an underlying set of truth criteria and concepts around 
which an integrated eurriculum could be established, may have equal validity. 
Those who oppose Hirst's concept of the curriculum, and, in particular, 
its implications for the secondary curriculum, may tend to regard such 
curricula as identical with the subject-oriented programmes current in 
1 . t Hirs , P.:it., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1975, p. 138. 
, .. 
43. 
many Tasmanian secondary schools. On this basis they may allege that the 
structure of knowledge as proposed is not a logical necessity but an 
historical anachronism, and that what is needed is a radically new 
organisation of curricula which enables pupils to be educated in the context 
in which they live. Such a point of view is strongly represented by 
Michael F.D. Young when he insists that: 
Starting with certain a priori assumptions.about the 
organisation (or forms) of knowledge (Hirst, 1965) 
the philosophers focus their criticism either on new 
topic-based syllabi '.which neglect these 'forms of 
understanding', or on new curricula for the so-called 
'less-able' or 'Newsom child', which, they argue, are 
consciously restricting such children from access to 
these forms of understanding which in the philosophers 
sense are 'education'. The problem with this kind of 
critique is that it is based on an absolute conception 
of a set of distinct forms of knowledge which correspond 
closely to the traditional areas of the academic curric-
ulum, and this justifies, rather than examines, what are 
no more than the socio-historical constraints of a 
particular time .1 
Furthermore, it may be argued, that the concept of an integrated 
curriculum necessitates that the life and experience of a person ought 
to be "developed as a unity", and not in the compartmentalized manner 
which Hirst's position implies. Such arguments may propose, therefore, 
through referenc~ to "life and experience" and-to persons developing as a 
unity, that both social factors and the "personal autonomy" of the individual 
are relevant to curriculum design. That is, if curriculum integration is 
possible, then the integrative aspects may be both social and/or personal. 
It is important that both such aspects be given further consideration. 
Hirst's analysis refers to one possible universal structuring of 
knowledge. It is often argued, on the assumption that no such universal 
structure is possible, that possible knowledge structures must be culturally 
bound. Clearly the extreme position of such an assertion would be a thesis 
in favour of the total relativity of all organisations of knowledge. In 
this case education may be considered to be "a selection and organisation 
1Young, Michael F.D., Curricula and the Social Organization of Knowledge, 
as in Brown, R. (ed.) Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, Tavistock, 
1973, p. 343. 
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of the available knowledge at a particular time" 1 That is, knowledge 
is socially derived and contextually dependent. 
Now it seems that, in most cases, the justifications for such 
analyses are based upon the notion that societies change through the 
progressive differentiation of the role structures within them. The social 
distribution of knowledge is altered and grows more complex as a result of 
this differentiation, and consequently there is an increase in specific 
knowledge related to the more specialized role structure and a corresponding 
diminution of the more general knowledge which is significant to members of 
the society irrespective of their particular role within that society. For 
each such system 
specializations may be seen as a culturally defined 
system of knowledge into which practitioners are 
socialized so that to a greater or lesser extent they 
come to use the same styles of thinking and to hold 
the same criteria of truth •2 
Thus it may be argued that academic subjects become established in the form 
·of social systems and that the modes of thought for each such system will be 
based upon one or more of the existing systems of knowledge. If there are 
different modes of logic which are characteristic of each such system, then 
different practitioners will have different perceptions of the contemporary 
, 
state of knowledge at a given time. Moreover it is postulated that each such 
specialization usually evolves what has been called a "subject-specific 
linguistic register 11 • 3 Each such system appears to have two possible 
functions. In the first instance the register permits the identification 
of a speaker with a parti~ular social structure. It also enables the 
communication of the thought processes which characterize each such structure, 
1Young, Michael F.D., Curricula and the Social Organisation of knowledge, 
as in Brown, R.D. (ed.) Knowle§ge, Education and Cultural Change, Tavistock, 
1973, p. 343. 
2 
3 
Berger, P.L. and 
Luckman, T. 
The Social Construction of Reali!Y, Allen Lane, 
Penguin Press, 1967, pp 56, 57. 
Young, Michael F.D., Curricula and the Social Organisation of Knowledge, 
as in Brown, R.D. (ed.) Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, Tavistoc~ 
1973, p. 343. 
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and hence ensures that access to certain social structures is not possible 
until this code has been learnt. 
Such registers change with time and, it may be proposed, as societies 
create more complex patterns of knowledge and behaviour, social positions 
evolve with 
the power to determine decisive socialization processes, 
and therefore the power to produce reality. Those who 
fill such positions manage the social pool of knowledge 
determining or legitimating how much and which specific 
types of knowledge are available to various categories 
of persons in that society .1 
Whereas for Hirst the integration of a curriculum is entirely dependent 
upon logical relationships between the various autonomous forms of knowledge, 
the integration of a curriculum based upon the thesis that knowledge is 
"socially derived", would appear to be dependent upon those determinations 
or "selections of knowledge" carried out by the "managers" of the society 
for each of the particular categories of people that have been identified 
in that society. Under such conditions education is 
a selection and organisation of the available knowledge 
at a particular time .2 
The integration of such curricula will depend upon the criteria used for 
the necessary selections of knowledge by the managers encompassing socially-
based aspects which may be shared by all members of that society. At the 
most elementary level such selections would concern 
pragmatically ·necessary knowledge that is needed for 
ordering social interaction that includes the rules 
governing etiquette and proper dress, so prominent in 
the manifest and later curriculum of schools .3 
But the possibility of finding such a social basis which is common to all 
~erger, P.L. ~and 
Luckman, T. 
The Social Construction of Reality, Allen Lane, 
Penguin Press, 1967, pp. 56, 57. 
2 
3 
Young, Michael F.D. Curricula and the Social Organisation of Knowledge, 
as in Brown, R.D. Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change, Tavistock, 
1973, p. 343. 
Musgrave, P. W., 
Hughes, P.W. (Ed.), 
Social Factors Affecting the Curriculum, as in 
The Teacher's Role in Curriculum Desi~n, Angus and 
Robertson, 1973, p. 15. 
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members of the society, and which forms a basis for curriculum integration, 
necessarily and ultimately depends upon the identification of a common 
set of values for all who belong to that particular society. Given such a 
set of values the manager, or curriculum planner, must then be able to 
select those items of socially generated knowledge which exemplify these 
values. Such selection necessarily requires an educational theory linking 
values with knowledge. Such a theory forms the basis for the justification 
of a curriculum so developed. Unless a naturalistic theory of values can 
be developed, such an educational theory may remain specualtive in the 
sense of not being based upon empirical evidence (or, as for a totalitar-
ian state, rest upon state-enforced systems of values). In this sense the 
above proposals have the same inherent difficulties as those embodied by 
Hirst's assertions in relation to curricula. That is, both proposals are 
contingent upon educational theories which indicate worthwhile knowledge. 
For Hirst all knowledge encompassed by the "forms of knowledge" is of 
value, whilst for the socially-based curricula knowledge is of value if it 
reflects common values of the society. 
But, basing curriculum integration on logical relationships between 
forms of knowledge and justifying the curriculum in terms of the value 
of the pursuit of rational knowledge would appear to be more desirable 
than basing integration upon selected societal values. The selection of 
a set of values and the consequent emphasis on.these values through the 
integrated curriculum to the possible exclusion of all other values would 
appear to lend itself to the possibility of indoctrination. Such indoctrina-
tion would probably be supported by the various.systems of sanctions and 
re~ards operating within the community as these would have probably been 
based upon the set of values originally accepted. 
Perhaps the fundamental difference between education and indoctrina-
tion is that the latter tends to treat all rules as inherent within the 
structure of the society. What is taken to be a fact or a principle, or 
presents as a )?erson or work to be admired, is placed beyond the reach of 
rational criticism. For education, on the contrary, criticisms are welcomed 
and there is a preparedness to admit that answers to questions and criticisms 
are not always known. This is not to propose that in indoctrination under-
standing, in the sense which Hirst proposes on the basis of his analysis 
of knowledge, is therefore excluded. The attainment of objectivity in 
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understanding may be made more difficult through indoctrination but is not 
necessarily prevented. In brainwashing the possibilities of such objectivity 
are eliminated through the confusion of mental processes. A rejection of 
Hirst's analysis would not, therefore, ensure indoctrination, but would 
work against the development of the mind through the acquisition of objective 
knowledge. 
On this basis the difficulties to be encountered in developing a 
socialiy-based integrated curriculum would seem to include, at least, the 
following: 
{i) assumptions of social differentiation and knowledge 
development; 
{ii) the concept of a society; 
{iii) the identification of conunon social values; 
{iv) the selection of such values about which the 
curriculum is to be integrated; 
{v) the proposal of an educational theory linking 
these values and knowledge; 
{vi) the subsequent selection of curriculum knowledge; 
{vii) the possibility of indoctrination occurring. 
. , 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation has been concerned with a discussion of Hirst's 
paper entitled "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" and with 
the implications of this paper for the secondary curriculum. In a sub-
sequent comment on this paper Hirst states that 
The concept of 'liberal education' I outlined on 
the basis of the forms of knowledge, was explicitly 
stipulative, it being suggested that knowledge and 
understanding alone should be the aim but across 
the range of the different forms of knowledge we 
have •1 
But if knowledge and understanding alone are to be considered when 
determining the objectives of an education, then only objectives which 
are intellectual may be considered. As non-intellectual objectives, such 
as physical education, would not be part of a liberal education, then a 
liberal education may not provide for the total education of the child. 
Even the intellectual skills included in a liberal education based entirely 
on the forms of knowledge would be limited. Linguistic skills, for example, 
would be included only for their value in assisting with the acquisition of 
knowledge from the different forms. For this reason the study of a second 
language would be precluded. A further weakness of this definition of a 
liberal education may be that, although a study of moral knowledge would 
be included, this study does not necessarily ensure any commitment by 
pupils to act morally. 
The analysis of knowledge into autonomous forms given by Hirst in 
the paper being considered provides for a classification of knowledge under 
labels such as "mathematics" and "the physical sciences". Each such label 
denotes a set of propositions which are true by assessment against those 
truth criteria characteristic of the particular form. These propositions 
are related according to the specific conceptual and logical structure of 
that form of knowledge. The denotations of these labels may, however, be 
' extended through common usage to cover additional sets of experiences, 
skills, attitudes and values. Thus the meaning of the phrase "the physical 
sciences" may be entirely different when considered in the context of the 
1Hirst, P.H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 96. 
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curriculum than when the programme of a science faculty in a university 
is being discussed. Similarly the denotations of words, such as "physics"·,-
which are used to describe sub-forms may be contextually dependent. Whilst, 
for example, "physics" may refer only to the conceptual and logical prop-
ositional structure of this sub-section of the physical sciences, it may 
also include skills, methods, attitudes and values which can be associated 
with a concern for, and an understanding of, knowledge in this area. Any 
proposal to include the study of physics in the secondary curriculum would, 
therefore, generate questions relating to not only whether or not the 
propositional structure of the sub-forms of physics should be studied, but 
also as to what width of interpretation should be given to the word "physics". 
That is, even if Hirst's analysis of knowledge into forms is accepted, it 
may not be possible to completely specify a secondary curriculum solely in 
terms of its knowledge content. 
It would seem difficult to separate teaching pupils an understanding 
of knowledge from a particular form of knowledge from teaching those skills, 
attitudes and values which may be associated with the knowledge being taught. 
The teacher of physics may seek to encourage particular attitudes and values 
by his pupils with respect to this subject. These may, for instance, include 
attitudes of respect for, and the valuing of, logical reasoning, experimental 
rigour and precision of measurement. Such attitudes and values would appear 
to be culturally dependent. This dependence is, perhaps, illustrated by 
the different attitudes and values which appear to have been associated 
with the mathematics of the ancient Greek civilisation and that of ancient 
Egypt. For the former mathematics seems to have been valued for its inherent 
logical structure, whilst for the latter mathematics was prized for its 
social utility. That is, whilst the knowledge content of a curriculum may 
be independent of the culture, the interpretation of the curriculum into 
teaching units may be dependent upon the culture, and particularly its 
language1 in which the interpretation occurs. 
As has be~n previously stated, the concepts of one form of knowledge 
may be connected with concepts of another form. This means that the bound-
aries between different subjects within the curriculum are not sharply 
defined. There is, therefore, in the secondary curriculum the possibility 
of different subjects including the teaching of the same knowledge. It is, 
however, probable that the justifications for the inclusion of any partic-
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ular area of knowledge in different subject curricula will be based upon 
various values. Thus there will be different attitudes and values 
associated with the teaching of this knowledge through the range of subjects. 
In a similar manner the objectives given for the study of a subject, which 
may bear the name of a form of knowledge, may not all be based upon the 
conceptual and logical structure of that form. Subjects such as social 
sciences and religion studies may include content drawn from several forms. 
How far then should secondary education, and by implication the 
secondary curriculum, be concerned with the study of the forms of knowledge? 
If the focus is upon these forms, then this will lead to Hirst's liberal 
education, but not to a total education. Although it is not essential in 
planning the secondary curriculum to organise it in terms of the forms or 
sub-forms of knowledge, it would appear advantageous for the planning of 
particular curriculum units to be considered in terms of the distinctive 
characteristics of the forms of knowledge. Whilst the objectives of early 
elementary education are socially-based and are,therefore,available outside 
the structures of these forms, a curriculum structure based on logical 
grounds may be worthwhile for secondary education. But the range of the 
objectives encompassed by secondary education will need to be considered 
in conjunction with logically-based curricula if much that may be import-
ant is not to be lost. That is, ma~ters of psychological and social concern 
-
to pupils, parents and the community should not be overlooked. Finally, 
No organisation of curriculum units necessarily dictates 
the methods to be employed. Even if our education needs 
to maintain a firm hold on the intellectual ends it 
serves, nothing will be gained if it pursues those by 
methods totally inappropriate for the majority of 
pupils •1 
1 . p Hirst, .H., Knowledge and the Curriculum, R.K.P., 1974, p. 99 
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"Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" 
The phrase 'liberal education' has today become something of a slogan 
which takes on different meanings according to its immediate context. 
It usually labels a form of education of which the author approves, but 
beyond that its meaning is often entirely negatively derived. Whatever 
else a liberal education is, it is not a vocational education, not an 
exclusively scientific education, or not a specialist education in any 
sense. The frequency with which the term is employed in this way 
certainly highlights the inadequacies of these other concepts and the 
need for a wider and, in the long run, more worthwhile form of education. 
But as long as the concept is merely negative in what it intimates, it 
has little more than debating value. Only when it is given explicit 
positive content can it be of use in the serious business of educational 
planning. It is my contention in this chapter that whatever vagaries 
there have been in the use of the term, it is the appropriate label for 
a positive concept, that of an education based fairly and squarely on the 
nature of knowledge itself, a concept central to the discussion of education 
at any level. 
The Greek notion of liberal education 
The fully developed Greek notion of liberal education was rooted in a 
number of related philosophical doctrines; first about the significance 
of knowledge for the mind, and secondly about the relationship between 
knowledge and reality. In the first category there was the doctrine that 
it is the peculiar and distinctive activity of the mind, because of its 
very nature, to pursue knowledge. The achievement of knowledge satisfies 
and fulfils the mind which thereby attains its own appropriate end. The 
pursuit of knowledge is thus the pursuit of the good of the mind and, 
therefore, an essential element in the good life. In addition, it was 
held that the achievement of knowledge is not only the attainment of the 
good of the mind itself, but also the chief means whereby the good life 
as a whole is to be found. Man is more than pure mind, yet mind is his 
essential distinguishing characteristic, and it is in terms of knowledge 
that his whole life is rightly directed. 
That knowledge is equal to its task was guaranteed by the second 
group of doctrines. These asserted that the mind, in the right use of 
reason, comes to know the essential nature of things and can apprehend 
what is ultimately real and immutable. Consequently, man no longer needs 
to live in terms of deceptive appearances and doubtful opinions and 
beliefs. All his experiences, life and thought can be given shape and 
perspective by what is finally true, by knowledge that corresponds to what 
is ultimately real. Further, the particular way in which reason is here 
represented as attaining knowledge, results in a view of the whole of man's 
understanding ,as hierarchically structured in various levels. From the 
knowledge of mere particulars to that of pure being, all knowledge has its 
place in a comprehensive and harmonious scheme, the pattern of which is 
formed as knowledge is developed in apprehending reality in its many 
diffe~ent manifestations. 
From these doctrines there emerged the idea of liberal .education as 
',_ 
a process concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of knowledge. But 
the doctrines give to this general idea particular meaning and significance; 
for they lead to a clear definition of its scope and content, and to a clear 
justification for education in these terms. The definition is clear, because 
education is determined objectively in range, in structure and in content by 
the forms of knowledge itself and their harmonious, hierarchical inter-
relations. There is here no thought of defining education in terms of 
knowledge and skills that may be useful, or in terms of moral virtues and 
qualities of mind that may be considered desirable. The definition is stated 
strictly in terms of man's knowledge of what is the case. The development 
of the mind to which it leads, be it in skills, virtues or other character-
istics, is thought to be necessarily its greatest good. 
The justification that the doctrines lend to this concept of education 
is threefold. First, such an education is based on what is true and not on 
uncertain opinions and beliefs or temporary values. It therefore has a 
finality which no other form of education has. Secondly, knowledge itself 
being a distinctive human virtue, liberal education has a value for the 
person as the fulfilment of the mind, a value which has nothing to do with 
utilitarian or vocational considerations. Thirdly, because of the signific-
ance of knowledge in the determination of the good life as a whole, liberal 
education is essential to man's understanding of how he ought to live, both 
individually and socially. 
Here, then, the Greeks attained the concept of an education that was 
'lib~ral' not simply because it was the education of free men rather than 
slaves, but also because they saw it as freeing the mind to function 
according to its true nature, freeing reason from error and illusion and 
freeing man's conduct from wrong. And ever since Greek times this idea of 
education has had its place. Sometimes it has been modified or extended in 
detail to accommodate within its scheme new forms of knowledge: for instance 
Christian doctrines and the various branches of modern science. Sometimes 
the concept has been misinterpreted: as in Renaissance humanism when class-
ical learning was equated with liberal education. Sometimes it has been 
strongly opposed on philosophical grounds: as by Dewey and the pragmatists. 
Yet at crucial points in the history of education the concept has constantly 
reappeared. It is hard to understand why this should be so. 
_ Education, being a deliberate, purposeful activity directed to the 
development of individuals, necessarily involves considerations of value. 
Where are these values to be found? What is to be their content? How are 
they to be justified? They can be, and often are, values that reflect the 
interests of a minority group in the society. They may be religious, 
·political or utilitarian in character. They are always open to debate and 
detailed criticism, and are always in need of particular justification. Is 
there not perhaps a more ultimate basis for the values that should determine 
education, some more objective ground? That final ground has, ever since 
the Greeks, been repeatedly located in man's conception of the diverse forms 
of knowledge he has achieved. And there has thus arisen the demand for an 
education whose definition and justification are based on the nature and 
significance of knowledge itself, and not on the predilections of pupils, 
the demands of society, or the whims of politicians. Precisely this demand 
was behind the development by the Greeks of an education in the seven liberal 
arts, an introduction to and a pursuit of the forms of knowledge as they 
were then conceived. It was precisely this demand ·that prompted Newman and 
Arnold in the nineteenth century to call for an education that aimed at the 
cultivation and development of the mind in the full range of man's under-
standing. It is the same demand that today motivates such classical 
realists as Maritain and R.M. Hutchins, 
A typical modern statement: the Harvard Report 
It may well be asked, however, whether those who do not hold the doctrines 
of metaphysical and epistemological realism can legitimately subscribe to 
a concept of education of this kind. Historically it seems to have had 
positive force only when presented in this particular philosophical frame-
work. But historical association must be distinguished from logical 
connection and it is not by any means obvious that all the characteristic 
features of the concept are dependent on such philosophical realism. If 
the doctrines about mind, knowledge and reality mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper are regarded as at best too speculative a basis for educa-
tional planning, as well they may be, the possibility of an education 
defined and justified entirely in terms of the scope and character of know-
ledge needs re-examination. The significance of the concept originally 
came directly from the place the basic doctrines give to knowledge in a 
unified picture of the mind and its relation to reality. Knowledge is 
achieved when the mind attains its own satisfaction or good by corresponding 
to objective reality. A liberal education in the pursuit of knowledge, is, 
therefore, seeking the development of the mind according to what i3 quite 
external to it, the structure and pattern of reality. But if one there is 
any serious questioning of this relationship between mind, knowledge and 
reality, the ~n1ole harmonious structure is liable to disintegrate. First 
there arise inevitably problems of definition. A liberal education defined 
in terms of knowledge alone is acceptable as long as knowledge is thought 
to be necessarily developing the mind in desirable ways, and hence promoting 
the good life. But if doubt is cast on these functions of knowledge, must 
not liberal education be redefined stating explicitly the qualities of mind 
and the moral virtues to which it is directed? 'And if knowledge is no 
longer seen as the understanding of reality but merely as the understanding 
of experience, what is to replace the harmonious, hierarchical scheme of 
knowledge that gave pattern and order to the education? Secondly there are 
equally serious problems of justification. For if knowledge is no longer 
thought to be rooted in some reality, or if its significance for the mind 
and the good life is questioned, what can be the justification for an 
education defined in terms of knowledge alone? 
Difficulties of both kinds, but particularly those of definition, can 
be seen in the well-known Harvard Committee Report: General Education in a 
Free Soci~l. (In the Committee's terminology the aims of a 'liberal' and 
a 'general' education are identical.) Though certain of the doctrines that 
originally supported the concept of a liberal education are implicit in 
this work, the classical view of the significance of knowledge for the mind 
is considerably weakened, and the belief that ~n metaphysics man has know-
ledge of ultimate reality is ignored, if not rejected. The result is an 
ambiguous and unsatisfactory treatment of the problem of definition and a 
limited and debatable treatment of the question of justification. Some 
examination of the Report on both these scores, particularly the former, 
will serve to show that adequate definition and justification are not only 
not dependent on the classical doctrines, but can in fact be based directly 
on an explication of the concepts of 'mind' and 'knowledge' and their 
relationships. 
The Report attempts the definition of a liberal education in two 
distinct ways: in terms of the qualities of mind it ought to produce and 
the forms of knowledge with which it ought to be concerned. What the precise 
relationship is between these two is not clear. It is asserted that they 
are 'images of each other', yet that there is no escape from 'describing 
general education at one time looking to the good md.n in society and at 
another time as dictated by the nature df knowledge itself 1 • 2 Which of the 
forms of description is to be given pride of place soon emerges, however. 
First, three areas of knowledge are distinguished, primarily by their 
distinctive methods: the natural sciences, the humanities and social studies. 
But it is made plain that 'the cultivation of certain aptitudes and attitudes 
of mind' is being aimed at, the elements of knowledge being the means for 
developing these. Liberal education is therefore best understood in terms 
of the characteristics of mind to whic~ it leads. 'By characteristics we 
mean aims so important as to prescribe 4ow general education should be 
carried out and which abilities ought to be sought above all others in every 
part of it. These abilities in our opinion are: to think effectively, to 
corrununicate thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among 
values•.3 The meaning of each of these four is elaborated at some length. 
Amongst the many things detailed of 'effective thinking' it is first said 
to be logical thinking of a kind that is applicable to such practical matters 
as deciding who to vote for and what wife to choose: it is the ability to 
extract universal truths from particular cases and to infer particulars from 
general laws: it is the ability to analyse a problem and to recombine the 
elements by the use of imagination. This thinking goes further than mere 
logic, however. It includes the relational thinking of everyday life, the 
ability to think at a level appropriate to a problem whatever its character. 
It includes too the imaginative thinking of the poet, the inventor, and the 
revolutionary. 'Communication', though 'obviously inseparable from effective 
thinking', is said to involve another group of skills, those of speaking 
and listening, writing and reading. It includes certain moral qualities 
such as candour, it covers certain vital aspects of social and political life 
and even the high art of conversation. 'The making of relevant value 
judgments' involves 'the ability of the student to bring to bear the whole 
range of ideas upon the area of experience', it is the art of effectively 
relating theory to practice, abstractions to facts, thought to action. 
Finally there is 'discrimination among values'. This includes the distinct-
ion of various kinds of value and their relative importance, an awareness 
of the values of character like fair play and self-control, intellectual 
values like the love of truth and aesthetic values like good taste, and, 
in addition, a commitment to such values in the conduct of life.4 
As to how exactly these abilities come to be those developed by the 
three types of knowledge, little is said. It is noted that 'the three 
phases of effective thinking, logical, relational, and imaginative, 
correspond roughly to the three divisions of learning, the natural sciences, 
the social studies, and the humanities, respectively'. 5 The difficult 
connection between education in the making of value judgments and the form-
ation of moral character is noted. Otherwise the remarks are of a general 
nature, emphasising that these abilities must be consciously developed in 
all studies and generalised as far as possible. 
This double, if one-sided, characterisation of liberal education seems 
to me unsatisfacto;ry and seriously misleading if what is said of the four 
abilities is examined more closely. In the first place, the notion that 
a liberal education can be directly characterised in terms of mental 
abilities and independently of fully specifying the forms of knowledge 
involved, is I think false. It is the result of a misunderstanding of the 
way in which mental abilities are in fact distinguishable. From what is 
said of 'effective thinking', it is perfectly plain that the phrase is 
being used as a label for mental activity which results in an achievement of 
some sort, an achievement that is, at least in principle, both publicly 
describable and publicly testable - the solving of a mathematical problem, 
responsibly deciding who to vote for, satisfactorily analysing a work of 
art. Indeed there can be effective thinking only when the outcome of 
mental activity can be recognised and judged by those who have the approp-
riate skills and knowledge, for otherwise the phrase has no significant 
application. Thus although the phrase labels a form of mental activity, 
and such mental processes may well be directly accessible only to the 
person whose processes they are, its description and evaluation must be 
in public terms occurring in public language. Terms which, like 'effective 
thinking', describe activities involving achievements of some sort, must have 
public criteria to mark them. But in that case, none of the four abilities 
can in fact be delineated except by means of their detailed public features. 
Such characterisation is in fact forced on the Committee when they come to 
amplify what they mean. But their approach is simply illustrative, as if 
the abilities are directly intelligible in themselves, and the items and 
features of knowledge they give merely examples of areas where the abilities 
can be seen. If the public terms and criteria are logically necessary to 
specifying what the abilities are, however, then no adequate account of 
liberal education in terms of these can be given without a full account in 
terms of the public features of the forms of knowledge with which it is 
concerned. Indeed the latter is logically prior and the former secondary 
and derivative. 
In the second place, the use of broad, general terms for these 
abilities serves in fact to unify misleading quite· disparate' achievements. 
For the public criteria whereby the exercise of any one of these abilities 
is to be judged are not all of a piece, Those that under the banner of 
'effective thinking' are appropriate in, say, aesthetic appreciation are, 
apart from certain very general considerations, inappropriate in, say, 
mathematical thinking. In each case the criteria are peculiar to the 
particular area of knowledge concerned. Similarly, for instance, 'communica-
tion1 in the sciences has only certain very basic features in common with 
'communication' in poetic terms. It is only when the abilities are fully 
divided out, as it were, into the various domains and we see what they refer 
to in public terms that it is at all clear what is involved in developing 
them. To talk of developing 'effective thinking' is like talking of 
developing 'successful games playing'. Plainly that unifying label is 
thoroughly misleading when what constitutes playing cricket has practically 
nothing in common with what constitutes playing tiddly-winks. The implica-
tions of the term are not at all appreciated until what is wanted is given 
detailed specification. It is vitally important to realise the very real 
objective differences that there are in forms of knowledge, and therefore 
in our understanding of mental processes that are related to these. .Maybe 
this unfortunate desire to use unifying concepts is a relic of the time 
when all forms of knowledge were thought to be similar, if not identical 
in logical structure and it was thought that the 'laws of logic' reflected 
the precise psychological operations involved in valid thinking. Be that 
as it may, the general terms used in the Report are liable both to blur 
essential distinctions and to direct the attention of educational planners 
into unprofitable descriptions of what they are after. 
Thirdly, in spite of any protestations to the contrary, the impression 
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is created by this terminology that it is possible to develop general 
unitary abilities of the stated kind. The extent to which this is true 
is a matter for empirical investigation into the transfer of training. 
Nevertheless such abilities must necessarily by characterised in terms 
of the public features of knowledge, and whatever general abilities 
there may be, the particular criteria for their application in diverse 
fields are vital to their significance for liberal education. But to 
think in these terms is to be in danger of looking for transfer of skills 
where none is discernible. We must not assume that skill at tiddly-winks 
will get us very far at cricket, or that if the skills have much in common, 
as in say squash and tennis, then rules for one activity will do as the 
rules for the other. 
Failure to appreciate these points leads all too readily to programmes 
of education for which quite unwarranted claims are made. It is sometimes 
said, for instance, that the study of one major science can in itself 
provide the elements of a liberal education - that it can lead to the develop-
ment of such abilities as effective thinking, communication, the making of 
relevant judgments,and even to some extent, discrimination among values. 
But this facile view is seen to be quite untenable if it is once understood 
how these abilities are defined, and how any one form of knowledge is related 
to them. Much more plausible and much more common is the attempt to relate 
directly the study of particular subjects to the devel.opment of pa.1:ticular 
unitary abilities. The Harvard Committee do this with subdivisions of 
'effective thinking' when they suggest that, roughly speaking, logical 
thinking is developed by the sciences, relational thinking by social studies, 
and imaginative thinking by the humanities. This, of course, could be said 
to be true by definition if logical thinking were taken to be just that kind 
of thinking that is developed by the study of the sciences. But such a 
straight and limited connection is not at all what is indicated in the 
Report. The forms of thinking there are much more generalised. It follows 
then that logical, relational and imaginative thinking must be independently 
defined. Because of the vagueness of the terms it might appear that this 
would be simple enough. But in fact this very vagueness makes the task 
almost impossible, for any one of the three terms might, with considerable 
justice, be applied to almost any example of thinking. (And the appropriate-
ness of using such a term as 'imaginative' to describe a distinct type of 
thinking rather than its manner or style is very debatable.) Even if these 
forms of- thinking can be satisfactorily defined, it remains to be shown that 
each one of them demands the exercise of one distinct but general ability 
and that this ability can be developed by study in one particular area of 
human learning. Generally speaking there is little such evidence. What 
there is on transfer of training suggests that it occurs only where there 
is marked logical similarity in the elements studied.6 
Finally the characterisation of a liberal education in these terms is 
misleading owing to the tendency for the concept to be broadened so that 
it is concerned not only with the development of the mind that results 
from the pursuit of knowledge, but also with other aspects of personal 
development, particularly emotional and moral, that may or may not be 
judged desirable. This tendency can be clearly seen in the Report's comments 
on the abilities of communication, making relevant judgments and discrimina-
ting among values. Stretching the edges of the concept in these ways leads 
to a much wider, more generalised notion of education. It then ceases to be 
one defined directly in terms of the pursuit of knowledge as liberal education 
originally was, and thus cannot be justified by justifying that pursuit. But 
this is surely to give up the concept in favour of another one that needs 
independent justification. The analysis of such a concept is beyond our 
present concern. 
A re-assertion and a reinterpretation 
On logical grounds, then, it would seem that a consistent concept of 
liberal education must be worked out fully in terms of the forms of know-
ledge. By these is meant, of course, not collection of information, but 
the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which 
are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning. An 
education in these terms does indeed develop its related abilities and 
qualities of mind, for the mind will be characterised to a greater or 
lesser degree by the features of the understanding it seeks. Each form 
of knowledge, if it is to be acquired beyond a general and superficial 
level, involves the development of creative imagination, judgment, thinking, 
communicative skills, etc., in ways that are peculiar to itself as a way 
of understanding experience. To list these elements, picking them out, as 
it were, across the forms of knowledge of which they are part and in each 
of which they have a different stamp, draws attention to many features 
that a liberal education must of course include. But it draws attention 
to them at the expense of the differences among them as they occur in 
the different areas. And of itself such listing contributes nothing to 
the basic determination of what a liberal education is. To be told that 
it is the development of effective thinking is of no value until this is 
explicated in terms of the forms of knowledge which give it meaning: for 
example in terms of the solving of problems in Euclidean geometry or 
coming to understand the poems of John Donne. To be told instead that it 
is concerned with certain specified forms of knowledge, the essential 
characteristics of which are then detailed explicitly as far as possible, 
is to be given a clear understanding of the concept and one which is 
unambiguous as to the forms of thinking, judgment, imagination and communic-
ation it involves. 
In his Gulbenkian Foundation Report Arts and Science Sides in the 
Sixth Form, Mr. A.D.C. Peterson comes considerably nearer than the 
Harvard Committee to the definition of a liberal education (once more 
termed here a 'general education'} by proceeding in just this fashion. 
Being concerned that this should not be worked out in terms of information, 
he shies- away from any direct use of the term 'knowledge' and defines the 
concept modestly as one that 'develops the intellect in as many as possible 
of the main modes of thinking•.7 These are then listed as the logical, 
the empirical, the moral and the aesthetic. The phrase 'modes of thinking', 
it is true, refers directly to forms of mental activity, and Mr. Peterson's 
alternatives for it, 'modes of human experience', 'categories of mental 
experience' and (elsewhere} 'types of judgment', all look in the same 
direction. Yet the 'modes' are not different aspects of mind that cut across 
the forms that human knowledge takes, as the Harvard Report's 'abilities' 
areo They are, rather, four parallel forms of mental development. To 
complete this treatment so that there is no ambiguity, however, it must 
be made clear·'in a way that Mr. Peterson does not make it clear, that the 
four forms can only be distinguished, in the last analysis, in terms of 
the public features that demarcate the areas of knowledge on which they 
stand. Logical, empirical, moral and aesthetic forms of understanding are 
distinguishable from each other only by their dist~nctive concepts and 
expressions and their criteria for distinguishing the true from the false, 
the good from the bad. If Mr. Peterson's 'modes' are strictly explicated 
on the basis of these features of knowledge, then his concept of education 
becomes one concerned with the development of the mind as that is determ-
ined by certain forms of knowledge. This is to be in sight of a modern 
equivalent of the traditional conception of liberal education. 
But the reassertion of this concept implies that there is once more 
the acceptance of some kind of 'harmony' between knowledge and the mind. 
This is, however, not now being maintained on metaphysical grounds. What 
is being suggested, rather, is that the 'harmony' is a matter of the 
logical relationship between the concept of 'mind' and the concept of 
'knowledge', from which it follows tha~ the achievement of knowledge is 
necessarily the development of mind - that is, the self-conscious rational 
mind of man - in its most fundamental aspect. 
Whatever else is implied in the phrase, to have 'a rational mind' 
certainly implies experience structured under some form of conceptual 
scheme. The various manifestations of consciousness, in, for instance, 
different sense perceptions, different emotions, or different elements of 
intellectual understanding, are intelligible only by virtue of the concept-
ual apparatus by which they are articulated. Further, whatever private forms 
of awareness there may be, it is by means of symbols, particularly in 
language, that conceptual articulation becomes objectified, for the symbols 
give public embodiment to the concepts. The result of this is that men are 
abie to come to understand both the external world and their own private 
states of mind in common ways, sharing the same conceptual schemata by 
learning to use symbols in the same manner. The objectification of under-
standing is possible because commonly accepted criteria for using the terms 
are recognised even if these are never explicitly expressed. But further, 
as the symbols derived from experience can be used to examine subsequent 
experience, assertions are possible which are testable as true or false, 
valid or invalid. There are thus also public criteria whereby certain 
forms of expression are assessable against experience. Whether the 'objects' 
concerned are themselves private to the individual like mental processes, 
or publicly accessible like temperature readings, there are here tests for 
the assertions which are themselves publicly agreed and accepted. 
It is by the use of such tests that we have come to have the whole 
domain of knowledge. The formulating and testing of symbolic expressions 
has enabled man to probe his experience for ever more complex relations 
and for finer and-finer distinctions, these being fixed and held for public 
sharing in the symbolic systems that have been evolved. But it is important 
to realise that this progressive attainment of a cognitive framework with 
public criteria has significance not merely for knowledge itself, for it 
is by its terms that the life of man in every particular is patterned and 
ordered. Without its structure all other forms of consciousness, including, 
for example, emotional experiences, or mental attitudes and beliefs, would 
seem to be unintelligible. For the analysis of them reveals that they lack 
independent intelligible structure of themselves. Essentially private though 
they may be in.many or all of their aspects, their characteristic forms are 
explicable only by means of the publicly rooted conceptual organisations 
we have achieved .. They can be understood only by means of the objective. 
features with which they are associated, round which they come to be organ-
ised and built. The forms of knowledge are thus the basic articulations 
whereby the whole of experience has become intelligible to man, they are the 
fundamental achievement of mind. 
Knowledge, however, must never be thought of merely as vast bodies 
of tested symbolic expressions. These are only ~he public aspects of 
the ways in which human experience has come to have shape. They are 
significant because they are themselves the objective elements round 
which the development of mind has taken place. To acquire knowledge is 
to become aware of experience as structured, organised and made meaning-
ful in some quite specific way, and the varieties of human knowledge 
constitute the highly developed forms in which man has found this possible. 
To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to experience the world in a way 
otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have a mind in a fuller sense. It 
is not that the mind is some kind of organ or muscle with its own inbuilt 
forms of operation, which if somehow developed, naturally lead to diff-
erent kinds of knowledge. It is not that the mind has predetermined 
patterns of functioning. Nor is it that the mind is an entity which 
suitably directed by knowledge comes to take on the pattern of, is con-
formed to, some external reality. It is rather that to have a mind 
basically involves coming to have experience articulated by means of 
various conceptual schemata. It is only because man has over millennia 
objectified and progressively developed these that he has achieved the 
forms of human knowledge, and the possibility of the development of mind 
as we know it is open to us today. 
A liberal education is, th~n, one that, determined in scope and con-
tent by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of 
mind. The concept is thus once more clearly and objectively defined in 
precisely the same way as the original concept. It is however no longer 
supported by epistemological and metaphysical doctrines that result in a 
hierarchical organisation of the various forms of knowledge. The detailed 
working out of the education will therefore be markedly different in certain 
respects. The distinctions between the various forms of knowledge which will 
principally govern the scheme of education will now be based entirely on 
analyses of their particula~ conceptual, logical and methodological features. 
The comprehensive character of the education will of course remain, since 
this is essentially part of the definition of the concept, but any question 
of the harmonious organisation of its various elements will depend on the 
relationships between them that are revealed by these analyses. 
But if the concept is reasserted in these terms, what now of the 
question of its justification? The justification of a liberal education 
as supported by the doctrines of classical realism was based on the ulti-
macy of knowledge as ordered and determined by reality, and the significance 
of knowledge for the mind and for the good life. Having weakend these 
doctrines, the Harvard Committee's justification of their concept ignores 
the question of the relationship between knowledge and· reality, and there 
is a specific rejection of the view that knowledge is in itself the good 
of the mind. They assert, however, the supreme significance of knowledge 
in the determination of· all human activity, and supplement this, as is 
certainly necessary because of the extende~ nature of their concept, by 
general considerations of the desirability of their suggestions. When 
once more the. concept is strictly confined so as to be determined by the 
forms of knowledge, 'the return to a justification of it without reference 
to what is generally thought desirable on social or similar grounds becomes 
possible. And such justification for the concept is essential if the 
education it delineates is to have the ultimate significance that, as was 
earlier suggested, is part of its raison d'etre. This justification must 
now however stem from what has already been said of the nature of knowledge 
as no metaphysical doctrine of the connection between knowledge and reality 
is any longer being invoked. / 
If the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of mind 
in its most basic sense, then it can be readily seen that to ask for a 
justification for the pursuit of knowledge is not at all the same thing 
as to ask for the justification for, say, teaching all children a foreign 
language or making them orderly and punctual in their behaviour. It is in 
fact a peculiar question asking for justification for any development of 
the rational mind at all. To ask for the justification of any form of 
activity is significant only if one is in fact committed already to seeking 
rational knowledge. To ask for a justification of the pursuit of rational 
knowledge itself therefore pre-supposes some form of commitment to what one 
is seeking to justify. Justification is possible only if what is being 
justified is both intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assess-
able according to accepted criteria. It assumes a commitment to these two 
principles. But these very principles are in fact fundamental to the pursuit 
of knowledge in all its forms, be it, for instance, empirical knowledge or 
understanding in the arts. The forms of knowledge are in a sense simply the 
working out of these general principles in particular ways. To give justifica-
tion of any kind of knowledge therefore involves using the principles in one 
specific form to assess their use in another. Any particular activity can 
be examj.ned for its rational character, for its adherence to these principles, 
and thus justified on the assumption of them. Indeed in so far as activities 
are rational this will be possible. It is commitment to them that character-
ises any rational activity as such. But the principles themselves have no 
such assessable status, for justification outside the use of the principles 
is not logically possible. This does not mean that rational pursuits in 
the end lack justification, for they could equally well be said to have 
their justification written into them. Nor is any form of viciously circ-
ular justification involved by assuming in the procedure what is being looked 
for. The situation is that we have here reached the ultimate point where the 
question of justification ceases to be significantly applicable. The apparent 
circularity is the result of the inter-relation between the concepts of 
rational justification and the pursuit of knowledge. 
Perhaps the finality of these principles can be brought out further by 
noting a negative form of the same argument. From this point of view, to 
question the pursuit of any kind of rational knowledge is in the end self-
defeating, for the questioning itself depends on accepting the very princ-
iples whose use is finally being called in question. 
It is because it is based on these ultimate principles that character-
ise knowledge itself and not merely on lower level forms of justification 
that a liberal education is in a very real sense the ultimate form of 
education. In spite of the absence of any metaphysical doctrine about 
reality this idea of li~eral education has a significance parallel to that 
of the original Greek concept. It is an education concerned directly with 
the development of the mind in rational knowledge, whatever form that 
freely takes. This parallels the original ~concept in that according to the 
doctrine of f~nction liberal education was the freeing of the mind to 
achieve its own good in knowledge. In each case it is a form of education 
knowing no limits other than those necessarily imposed by the nature of 
rational knowledge and thereby itself developing in man the final court of 
appeal in all human affairs. 
As here reformulated the concept has, again like the original object-
ivity, though this is no longer backed by metaphysical realism. For it is 
a necessary feature of knowledge as such that thAre be.public criteria 
whereby the true is distinguishable from the false, the good from the bad, 
the right from the wrong. It is the existence of these criteria which 
gives objectivity to knowledge; and this in its turn gives objectivity to 
the concept of liberal education. A parallel to another form of justifica-
tion thus remains, and the concept continues to warrant its label as that 
of an education that frees the mind from, error and illusion. Further, as 
the determination of the good life is now considered to be itself the 
pursuit of a particular form of rational knowledge, that in which what 
ought to be done is just~fied by the giving of reasons, this is seen as a 
necessary part of a liberal education. And as all other forms of knowledge 
contribute in their way to moral understanding, the concept as a whole is 
once more given a kind of justification in its importance for the moral 
life. B~t this justification, like that of objectivity, no longer has the 
distinct significance which it once had, for it is again simply a necessary 
consequence of what the pursuit of knowledge entails. Nevertheless, liberal 
education remains basic to the freeing of human conduct from wrong. 
Certain basic philosophical considerations 
Having attempted a reinstatement of the concept without its original 
philosophical backing, what of the implications of this for the practical 
conduct of education? In working these out it is necessary first to try 
to distinguish the various forms of knowledge and then to relate them in 
some way to the organisation of the school or college curriculum. The first 
of these is a strictly philosophical task. The second is a matter of prac-
tical planning that involves many considerations other than the purely 
philosophical, and to this I will return when certain broad distinctions 
between forms of knowledge have been outlined. 
As stated earlier, by a form of knowledge is meant a distinct way in 
which our experience becomes structured round the use of accepted public 
symbols. The symbols thus having public meaning, their use is in some 
way testable against experience and there is the progressive development 
of series of tested symbolic expressions. In this way experience has been 
probed further and further by extending and elaborating the use of the 
symbols and by means of these it has become possible for the personal exper-
ience of individuals to become more fully structured, more fully understood. 
The various forms of knowledge can be seen in low level developments within 
the common area of our knowledge of the everyday world. From this there 
branch out the developed forms which, taking certain elements in our common 
knowledge as a basis, have grown in distinctive ways. In the developed 
forms of knowledge the following related distinguishing features can be 
seen: 
(1) They each involve certain central concepts that are peculiar in 
character to the form. ·For example, those of gravity, acceleration, 
hydrogen, and photo-synthesis characteristic of the sciences; number, 
integral and matrix in mathematics; God, sin and predestination in 
religion; ought, good and wrong in moral know.ledge. 
(2) In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts that denote, 
if perhaps in a very complex way, certain aspects of experience, form 
a network of possible relationships in which experience can be understood. 
As a result the form has a distinctive logical structure. For example, 
the terms and statements of mechanics can be meaningfully related in 
certain strictly limited ways only, and the same is true of historical 
explanation. 
(3) The form, by virtue of its particular tenns and logic, has express-
ions or statements (pcssibly answering a distinctive type of question) 
that in some way or other, however indirect it may be, are testable 
against experience. This is the case in scientific knowledge, moral know-
ledge, and in the arts, though in the arts no questions are explicit and 
the criteria for the tests are only partially expressible in words. Each 
form, then, has distinctive expressions that are testable against exper-
ience in accordance with parti·cular criteria that are peculiar to the 
form. 
(4) The forms have developed particular techniques and skills for 
exploring experience and testing their distinctive expressions, for inst-
ance the techniques of the sciences and those of the various literary arts. 
The result has been the amassing of all the symbolically expressed knowledge 
that we now have in the arts and the sciences. 
Though the various forms of knowledge are distinguishable in these ways 
it must not be assumed that all there is to them can be made clear and 
explicit by these means. All knowledge involves the use of symbols and the 
making of judgments in ways that cannot be expressed in words and can only 
be lear~t in a tradition. The art of scientific investigation and the 
development of appropriate experimental tests, the forming of an historical 
explanation and the assessment of its truth, the appreciation of a poem: 
all of these activities are high arts that are not in themselves communic-
able simply by words. Acquiring knowledge of any form is therefore to a 
greater or lesser extent something that cannot be dQne simply by solitary 
study of the symbolic expressions of knowledge, it must be learnt from a 
master on the job. No doubt it is because the forms require particular 
training of this kind in distinct worlds of discourse, because they necess-
itate the development of hi~h critical standards according to complex 
criteria, because they involve our coming to look at experience in partic-
ular ways, that we refer to them as disciplines. They are indeed disciplines 
that form the mind. 
Yet the dividing lines that can be drawn between different disciplines 
by means of the four suggested distinguishing marks are neither clear enough 
nor sufficient for demarcating the whole world of modern knowledge as we 
know it. The central feature to which they point is that the major forms 
of knowledge, or disciplines, can each be distinguished by their dependence 
on some particular kind of test against experience for their distinctive 
expressions. On this ground alone however certain broad divisions are 
apparent. The sciences depend crucially on empirical experimental and 
observational tests, mathematics depends on deductive demonstrations from 
certain sets of axioms. Similarly moral knowledge and the arts involve 
distinct forms of critiGal tests though in these cases both what the tests 
are and the ways in.which they are applied are oJly partially statable. 
(Some would in fact dispute the status of the arts as a form of knowledge 
for this very,reason.) Because of their particular logical features it 
seems to me necessary to distinguish also as separate disciplines both 
historical and religious knowledge, and there is perhaps an equally good 
case, because of the nature of their central concepts, for regarding the 
human sciences separately from the physical sciences. But within these 
areas further distinctions must be made. These are usually the result of 
the groupings of knowledge round a number of related concepts, or round 
particular skills or techniques. The various sciences and the various arts 
can be demarcated within the larger units of which they are in varying 
degrees representative in their structure, by these me::i.ns. 
But three other important classifications of knowledge must in addition 
be recognised. First there are those organisations which are not themselves 
disciplines or subdivisions of any discipline. They are formed by building 
together round specific objects, or phenomena, or practical pursuits, know-
ledge that is characteristically rooted elsewhere in more than one discip-
line. It is not just that these organisations make use of several forms 
of knowledge, for after all the sciences use mathematics, the arts use 
historical knowledge and so on. Many of the disciplines borrow from each 
other. But these organisations are not concerned, as the disciplines are, 
to validate any one logically distinct form of expression. They are not 
concerned with developing a particular structuring of experience. They are 
held together simply by their subject matter, drawing on all forms of know-
ledge that can contribute to them. Geography, as the study of man in 
relation to his environment, is an example of a theoretical study of th~s 
kind, engineering an example of a practical nature. I see no reason why 
such organisations of knowledge, which I shall refer to as 'fields', should 
not be endlessly constructed according to particular theoretical or practical 
interests. Second, whilst moral knowledge is a distinct form, concerned 
with answering questions as to what ought to be done in practical affairs, 
no specialised subdivisions of this have been developed. In practical 
affairs, moral questions, becau~e of their character, naturally arise 
alongside questions of fact and technique, so that there have been formed 
'fields' of practical knowledge that include distinct moral elements within 
them, rather than the subdivisions of a particular discipline. Political, 
legal and educational theory are perhaps the clearest examples of fields 
where moral knowledge of a developed kind is to be found. Thirdly, there 
are certain second order forms of knowledge which are dependent for their 
existence on the other primary areas. On the one hand there are the essen-
tially scientific studies of language and symbolism as in granunar and phil-
osophy. On the other hand there are the logical and philosophical studies 
of meaning and justification. These would seem to constitute a distinct 
discipline by virtue of their particular concepts and criteria of judgment. 
In summary, then, it is suggested that the forms of knowledge as we 
have them can be classified as follows: 
I Distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge (subdivisible): 
mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, 
literature and the fine arts, philosophy. 
II Fields of knowledge: theoretical, _practical (these may or may 
not include elements of moral knowledge) • 
It is the distinct disciplines that basically constitute the range of 
unique ways we have of understanding experience if to these is added the 
category of moral knowledge. 
The planning and practical conduct of liberal education 
Turning now to the bearing of this discussion on the planning ~nd conduct 
of a liberal education, certain very general comments about its character-
istic features can be made though detailed treatment would involve psych-
ological and other considerations that are quite beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
In the first place, as liberal education is concerned with the com-
prehensive development of the mind in acquiring ~nowledge,it is aimed at 
achieving an understanding of experience in many different ways. This 
means the acquisition by critical training and discipline not only of facts 
but also of complex conceptual schemes and of the arts and techniques of 
different types of reasoning and judgment. Syllabuses and curricula cannot 
therefore be constructed simply in terms of information and isolated skills. 
They must be constructed so as to introduce pupils as far as possible into 
the interrelated aspects of each of the basic forms of knowledge, each of 
the several disciplines. And they must be constructed to cover at least 
in some measure the range of knowledge as a whole. 
In a programme of liberal education that is based directly on the 
study of the specific disciplines, examples of each of the different areas 
must of course be chosen. Selection of this kind is not however simply an 
inevitable practical consequence of the vast growth of knowledge. It is 
equally in keeping with what a liberal education is aiming at. Though its 
aim is comprehensive it is not after the acquisition of encyclopaedic 
information. Nor is it after the specialist knowledge of the person fully 
trained in all the particular details of a branch of knowledge. Such a 
specialist can not only accurately employ the concepts, logic and criteria 
of a domain but also knows the skills and techniques involved in the pursuit 
of knowledge quite beyond the immediate areas of corranon human experience. 
Nor is liberal education concerned with the technician's knowledge of the 
detailed application of the disciplines in practical and theoretical fields. 
What is being sought is, first, sufficient immersion in the conceptsv logic 
and criteria of the discipline for a person to come to know the distinctive 
way in which it 'works' by pursuing these in particular cases; and then 
sufficient generalisation of these over the whole range of the discipline 
so that his experience begins to be widely structured in this distinctive 
manner. It is this coming to look at things in a certain way that is being 
aimed at, not the ability to work out in minute particulars all the details 
that can be in fact discerned. It is the ability to recognise empirical 
assertions or aesthetic judgments for what they are, and to know the kind of 
considerations on which their validity will depend, that matters. Beyond 
this an outline of the major achievements in each area provides some grasp 
of the range and scope of experience that has thus become intelligible. 
Perhaps this kind of understanding is in fact most readily distinguishable 
in the literary arts as critical appreciation in contrast to the achieve-
ment of the creative writer or the literary hack. But the distinction is 
surely applicable to other forms of knowledge as well. 
/ 
This is not to assert that 'critical' appreciation in any form of 
knowledge can be adequately achieved without some development of the under-
standing of the specialist or technician. Nor is it to imply that this 
understanding in the sciences, the arts or moral issues can be had without 
participation in many relevant creative and practical pursuits. The extent 
to which this is true will vary from discipline to discipline and is in 
fact in need of much investigation, particularly because of its importance 
for moral and_aesthetic education. But it is to say that the aim of the 
study of a discipline in liberal education is not that of its study in a 
specialist or technical course. The first is concerned with developing a 
person's ways of understanding experience, the others are concerned with 
mastering the details of knowledge, how it is established, and the use of 
it in other enterprises, particularly those of a practical nature. It is 
of course perfectly possible for a course in physics, for ~xample, to be 
devoted to a double purpose if it is deliberately so designed. It may 
provide both a specialist knowledge of the subject and.at the same time a 
genuine introduction to the form of scientific knowledge. But the two 
purposes are quite distinct and there is no reason to suppose that by 
aiming at one the other can automatically be achieved as well. Yet it 
would seem to be true that some specialist study within a discipline, 
if it is at all typical of the discipline, is necessary to understanding 
the form of knowledge in any developed sense. The study of a discipline 
as part of liberal education, however, contributes practically nothing 
directly to any specialist study of it, though it does serve to put the 
specialism into a much wider context. 
A liberal education approached directly in terms of the disciplines 
will thus be composed of the study of at least paradigm examples of all 
the various forms of knowledge. This study will be sufficiently detailed 
and sustained to give genuine insight so that pupils come to think in these 
terms, using the concepts, logic and criteria accurately in the different 
domains. It will then include generalisation of the particular examples 
used so as to whow the range of understanding in the various forms. It 
will also include some indication of the relations between the forms where 
these overlap and their significance in the major fields of knowledge, 
particularly the practical fields, that have been developed. This is partic-
ularly important for moral education, as moral questions can frequently be 
solved unly by calling on the widest possible range of human understanding. 
As there is in fact no developed discipline of moral knowledge, education 
in moral understanding must necessarily be approached in a rather different 
way. For if it is to cover more than everyday personal matters this has to 
be by the study of issues that occur in certain particular fields of know-
l~dge. The major difficulty this presents will be referred to briefly later. 
The important point here is that though moral understanding has to be pursued 
in contexts where it is not the only dominant interest, the aim of its pur-
suit is precisely the same as for all other elements in a liberal education, 
the understanding of experi~nce in a unique way. What is wanted (just as in 
the study of the disciplines per se) is, basically, the use of the approp-
riate concepts, logic, and criteria, and the appreciation of the range of 
understanding in this form. .-
It is perhaps important to stress the fact that this education will be 
one in the forms of knowledge themselves and not merely a self-conscious 
philosophical treatment of their chara~teristics. Scientific and historical 
knowledge are wanted, not knowledge of the philosophy of science and the 
philosophy of history as substitutes. A liberal education can only be 
planned if distinctions in the forms of knowledge are clearly understood, 
and that is a philosophical matter. But the education itself is only partly 
in philosophy, and that is only possible when pupils have some grasp of the 
other disciplines themselves. 
Precisely what sections of the various disciplines are best suited to 
the aims of liberal education cannot be gone into here. It is apparent 
that on philosophical grounds alone some branches of the sciences, for 
instance, would seem to be much more satisfactory as paradigms of scientific 
thinking than others. Many sections of physics are probably more comprehen-
sive and clear in logical character, more typical of the well developed 
physical sciences than, say, botany. If so, they would, all other things 
being equal, serve better as an introduction to scientific knowledge. 
Perhaps in literature and the fine arts the paradigm principle is less easy 
to apply though probably many would favour a course in literature to any 
one other. But whatever the discipline, in practice all other things are 
not in fact equal and decisions about the content of courses cannot be taken 
without careful regard to the abilities and interests of the students for 
whom they are designed. 
Yet hovering round such decisions and questions of syllabus planning 
there is frequently found the belief that the inherent logical structure 
of a discipline, or a branch of a discipline necessarily determines exact-
ly what and exactly how the subject is to be taught and learnt. The small 
amount of truth and the large amount of error in this belief can only be 
distinguished by clarifying what the logic of a subject is. It is not a 
series of intellectual steps that must be climbed in strict order. It is 
not a specific psychological channel along which the mind must travel if 
there is to be understanding. This is to confuse logical characteristics 
with psychological processes. The logic of a form of knowledge shows the 
meaningful and valid ways in which its terms and criteria are used. It 
constitutes the publicly accepted framework of knowledge. The psychological 
activities of the individual when concerned with this knowledge are not in 
general prescribed in any temporal order and the mind, as it were, plays 
freely within and around the framework. It is simply that the framework 
lays down the general formal relations of the concepts if there is to be 
knowledge. The logic as publicly expressed consists of the general and , 
formal principles to which the terms must conform in knowledge. Coming to 
understand a form of knowledge involves coming to think in relations that 
satisfy the public criteria. How the mind plays round and within ~hese is 
not itself being laid down at all, there is no dragooning of psychological 
processes, only a marking out of the territory in which the mind can wander 
more or less at will. Indeed understanding a form of knowledge is far more 
like coming to know a country than climbing a ladder. Some places in a 
territory may only be get-at-able by a single specified route and some forms 
of knowledge may have concepts and relations that cannot be u~derstood without 
first understanding certain others. But that countries are explorable only 
in one way is in general false, and even in mathematics, the most strictly 
sequential form of knowledge we have, many ways of coming to know the 
territory are possible. The logic of a subject is relevant to what is being 
taught, for its patterns must be accepted as essential to the form of know-
ledge. But how those patterns are best discer~ed is a matter for empirical 
investigation. 
School subjects in the disciplines as we at present have them are in 
no way sacrosanct on either logical or psychological grounds. They are 
necessarily selections from the forms of knowledge that we have and may or 
may not be good as introductions for the purposes of liberal education. In 
most cases they have developed under a number of diverse influences. The 
historical growth of the subjects has sometimes dominated the programmes • 
. The usefulness of certain elements, the demands of higher specialist educa-
tion, certain general 'psychological' principles such as progressing from 
the simple to the complex, from the particular to.-the general, the concrete 
to the abstract, all these factors and many others have left their marks. 
This being so, many well established courses need to be critically re-examined 
both philosophically and psychologically before they can be accepted as suit-
able for libe~al education. Superficially at least most o~ them would seem 
to be quite inappropriate for this purpose. 
Though a liberal education is most usually approached directly in the 
·study of various branches of the disciplines, I see no reason to think 
that this must necessarily be so. It is surely possible to construct 
programmes that are in the first place organised round certain fields of 
knowledge either theoretical or practical. The study of aspects of power, 
natural as well as social and political, might for instance be one element 
in such a scheme: or a regional study that introduces historical, geograph-
ical, industrial and social cons~derations: or a practical project of 
design and building involving the sciences, mathematics and visual arts. 
In this case, however, it must be recognised that the fields are chosen 
because together they can be used to develop understanding of all the var-
ious forms of knowledge, and explicit steps must be taken to see that this 
end is achieved. There will necessarily be the strongest tendency for 
liberal education to be lost sight of and for the fields to be pursued in 
their own right developing the techniques and skills which they need. These 
may be valuable and useful in many ways, and perhaps essential in many a 
person's whole education. (Certainly liberal education as is here being 
understood is only one part of the education a person ought to have, for 
it omits quite deliberately for instance specialist education, physical 
education and character training.} But a course in various fields of know-
ledge will not in fact be a liberal education unless that aim is kept absol-
utely clear and every opportunity is taken to lead to a fuller grasp of the 
disciplines. Again some fields of study will be better for this purpose 
than others but all will demand the highest skill from the teacher, who 
must be under no misapprehension as to what the object of the exercise 
really is. Yet it is difficult to see how this kind of approach can be 
fully adequate if it does not in the end lead to a certain amount 0f study 
of the distinct disciplines themselves. For whatever ground may have been 
covered indirectly a satisfactory understanding of the characteristically 
distinct approaches of the different fonns is hardly possible without some 
direct gathering together of the elements of the disciplines that have 
been implicit in all that has been done. 
Whatever the pattern of a liberal education in its later stages, it 
must not be forgotten that there is_being presupposed a broad basic educa-
tion in the common area of everyday knowledge where the various disciplines 
can be seen in embryo and from which they branch out as distinct units. In 
such a basic primary education, the evergrowing range of a child's experience 
and the increasing use of linguistic and symbolic forms lays the foundation 
for the various modes of understanding, scientific, historical, religious, 
moral, and so on~ Out of this general pool of knowledge the disciplines 
have slowly become ever more differentiated and it is this that the student 
must come to understand, not confusing the forms of knowledge but appreciat-
ing them for what they are in themselves, and recognising their necessary 
limitations. 
But is then the outcome of a liberal education to be simply the achieve-
ment of a series of discreet ways of understanding experience? In a very 
real sense yes, but in another sense not entirely. For one thing, we have 
as yet not begun to understand the complex interrelations of the different 
forms of knowledge themselves, for they do not only have unique features but 
common features too, and in addition one discipline often makes extensive 
use of the achievements of another. But we must also not forget that the 
various forms are firmly rooted in that common world of persons and things 
which we all share, and into this they take back in subtle as well as 
simple ways the understanding they have achieved. The outcome of a liberal 
education must therefore not be thought of as producing ever greater dis-
integration of the mind but rather the growth of ever clearer and finer 
distinctions in our experience. If the result is not some quasi-aesthetic 
unity of the mind neither is it in any sense chaos. Perhaps the most suggest-
ive picture of the outcome is that used by Professor Michael Oakeshott, 
though for him it has more literal truth than is here intended. In this 
the various forms of knowledge are seen as voices in a conversation, a 
conversation to which they each contribute in a distinctive way. If taken 
figuratively, his words express more succinctly than mine can precisely 
what it seems to me a liberal education is and what its outcome will be. 
Notes 
As civilised human beings, we are the inheritors, either of an 
inquiry about outselves and the world, nor of an accumulating 
body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the 
primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the 
course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in 
public and within each of ourselves. Of course there is argument 
and inquiry and information, but wherever these are profitable 
they are to be recognized as passages in this conversation, and 
perhaps they are not the most captivating of the passages ••• 
Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic 
profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an 
activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure ••• 
Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill 
and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize 
the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and 
in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate 
to conversation And it is this conversation which, in the end, 
gives place and character to every human activity and utterance. 8 
1 General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee, 
Oxford University Press, 1946. 
2 Ibid., p. 58. 
3 Ibid., pp. 64-5. 
4 Ibid., pp. 65-73. 
5 Ibid., p. 67. 
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In these he suggests that the prime purpose of the study of 
literature, history and philosophy is that each develops one of 
the central powers of the mind - creative imagination, practical 
wisdom, and logical thought. Once more we are up against the 
question of the definition of these 'powers' and if that problem 
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